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ABSTRACT 
 
Earlier studies have shown that layoff announcements cause negative and significant 
stock price reactions. However, some studies have also found that investors react posi-
tively to corporate layoff announcements. Thus, the results have been mixed. The re-
search has also shown that the ownership structure of firms is affecting firm values and 
performance. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the stock market reac-
tions to layoff announcements in Finland and does the reaction diverge between firms 
with different ownership structures. The sample firms are divided into six different 
ownership structure groups: state, family/person, foreign, institutional and concentrated 
or diffused ownership firms. In addition, the effect of business cycle, the reason for 
layoff and the size of the layoff are examined. The theoretical framework of this study 
includes market efficiency and stock valuation. 
 
The sample of this study includes 186 layoff announcements during the research period 
2007–2014. Event study methodology is used to study the stock market reactions. The 
event window is 11 days, starting five days prior the announcement and ending five 
days after the announcement. Furthermore, the cumulative abnormal returns are tested 
with two OLS regression models, which include dummy variables for different owner-
ship groups, layoff reason and business cycle, a control variable for layoff size and 
layoff reason interaction term. 
 
The results indicate that layoff announcements cause negative and statistically signifi-
cant stock market reaction. The regression results show that the state ownership dummy 
is positive and significant. Thus, state ownership has a positive impact on the stock 
market reaction to layoff announcements. Therefore, the hypothesis that layoff an-
nouncements effects diverge between different ownership structure firms can be accept-
ed. Furthermore, interaction term regression results show that concentrated ownership 
firms which announce reactive layoff reason have negative and significant effect on the 
stock price response. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Layoff announcement, Abnormal return, Ownership structure, Event 
study 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Layoffs are common especially in western, developed countries, where the wages and 
producing costs are high. Normally layoffs become more popular during recessions or 
for example financial crisis. However, companies reduce their staff also during the up-
swings or when the economy is growing steadily. Behind these layoffs is usually the 
shareholder value - way of thinking, which states that the only purpose for the company 
is to maximize market value. Nevertheless, often layoffs are necessary for companies to 
continue operations. For instance, Chen, Mehrotra, Sivakumar and Yu (2001) state that 
employee redundancies are reasonable and enable firms to survive. 
 
During the years 2006–2014 total of 95 861 persons were laid off in Finland. The big-
gest amount (19 658) was reduced in 2009. (SAK 2015.) That was most likely due to 
the financial crisis and bad condition of the economy. In the fast growth period 2007 
only 4 373 employees lost their jobs in Finland (SAK 2015). It’s only a fraction of the 
2009 amount. In the recent years the situation hasn’t been much better than during the 
financial crisis. Layoff announcements continue to appear in the everyday news proba-
bly in the future as well. 
 
Companies make redundancies due to many reasons. Layoffs can be for example reac-
tion to changes in the demand or in the competitive situation of the company. In addi-
tion, firms may experience financial distress and due to that, they have to reduce their 
costs. However, pure strategic reasons, restructuring and downsizing are usually com-
mon reasons for layoffs. (Lee 1997.) One perspective is that managers see future costs 
more predictable than future profits and cutting costs by reducing workforce is an easy 
alternative to improve efficiency (Cascio 1993). Moreover, companies may need to re-
duce their staff due to new capital or technology changes in the production, which de-
crease the demand for workers. Despite the announced reasons media reviews layoffs 
with suspicion. (Chen et al. 2001.) Thus, the media might have an effect on investors’ 
responses.  
 
When layoffs are announced, the stock price is expected to move in either positive or 
negative direction. Often the reasons behind the layoff affect to the course of the reac-
tion. Earlier studies have mostly focused on examining how the announced reasons for 
the layoff and the financial condition of the firm influence the stock price reaction. For 
example, the direction can depend on if the layoffs are proactive or reactive (Kashefi & 
McKee 2002). The proactivity means here that layoffs are defined as a part of the strat-
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egy and reactive instead react to financial distress (Kashefi & McKee 2002). In addition, 
the positivity or negativity of the reaction can depend on the magnitude of the layoff 
(Lee 1997).  
 
This study is bringing new perspective to the field and studies whether there is a differ-
ence in the reactions due to the ownership structure of the firms. The stock price re-
sponse on layoff announcements might differ depending on who owns the shares of the 
lay offing company. For example, the effects can be different due to the psychological 
feelings of the investors. For instance, for family firms the stock market reaction to 
layoff announcements can be more negative than for other ownership firms because 
according to Dyer and Whetten (2006) family firms are regarded to act in a socially 
responsible way towards their employees and are more concerned about the reputation 
of the firm. Thus, if a family firm reduces its workforce it might be seen as a negative 
action by the investors.  
 
Traditionally in European firms the management has been powerful and the sharehold-
ers in a relatively weak position. In recent years this setting has begun to change and the 
position of owners has become stronger. In northern American companies, on the other 
hand, the ownership has traditionally been broadly diversified and the investments’ re-
turn has been the main objective for the firms. In contrary, in Europe and, for example, 
in Japan the ownership structure has been significantly more concentrated. (Knüpfer & 
Puttonen 2014: 17.). In addition, globalization has increased foreign ownership in Finn-
ish companies. At the same time the pension and insurance institutions have increased 
their ownership stake and become significant owners. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2014.)  
 
Moreover, in Finland the state owns large portion of shares in big companies. The mag-
nitude of state ownership and the role of the cooperative companies are features that 
separate Finland from other western countries. In academic research the state ownership 
has proven to have adverse effects. State owned companies are often criticized about 
inefficient use of workforce. They concentrate more on preserving the employment ra-
ther than financial efficiency. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2014.) Thus, the investors can 
react more positively to the layoff announcements made by the firms that have state as a 
largest owner because the layoffs are therefore improving the efficiency of possibly 
inefficient firm. Furthermore, the state as a shareholder might not react to the layoff 
announcements and thus, will not sell the shares as for example some individual inves-
tors might do. That might lead to a smaller stock price reaction for state ownership 
firms.  
13 
 
As shareholders, the institutional investors have very different goals than the state. The 
main goal for institutional owners is to maximize the risk-adjusted returns. Institutional 
ownership is complicated due to problems with insider trading. Direct participation to 
the management of companies restricts the possibilities of an investor to trade with the 
firms’ shares. If the institutional investors would actively participate in the management, 
they couldn’t pursue their normal strategy which requires active management of the 
holdings. Thus, institutional investors have very few incentives to act as the controlling 
owner. Moreover, research has shown that institutional investors rather vote with their 
legs than start acting as the controlling owners. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2014.) 
Therefore, if the institutional owners see the layoffs as a negative thing they might just 
sell the shares and this could lead to more negative and bigger stock price reaction than 
for example for state ownership firms.  
 
In simplicity, publicly traded companies can be divided into two different categories: 
diffusely owned companies where the company management has the authority in deci-
sion making and companies which have major shareholders that have power to control 
the company. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2014.) Studies have found that, for example, 
large outside owners affect firm valuation positively. Thus, large outside shareholders 
may act as good monitors for the management. (Bennett 2010.) 
 
 
1.1. Previous studies  
 
According to the previous studies, the layoff announcements have often had a signifi-
cant impact on stock prices (see e.g. Palmon, Sun & Tang 1997, Kashefi & McKee 
2002). However, the results have been quite mixed. Overall, in most studies the effect 
has been negative. The studies have mostly sorted the announcements by the reason of 
the layoff. This chapter presents few of the famous papers studying the effects of layoff 
announcements on stock valuation. Moreover, some findings about the effects of own-
ership structure on firm value are discussed in brief. 
 
The effects of layoffs have been studied already since the 1980’s, but the most advanced 
studies were published in 1990’s. For example, Worrell, Davidson and Sharma’s (1991) 
study was among the first ones that reviewed economical perspective of layoff an-
nouncements. They find negative stock price reaction during the layoff announcements. 
On the other hand, Palmon, Sun and Tang (1997), for example, find positive effects 
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when the layoff reason is efficiency enhancing. Kashefi and McKee (2002) and Hahn 
and Reyes (2004) also find positive changes in the stock prices. In their studies the rea-
sons for the layoffs that cause positive returns are proactivity and restructuring.  
 
According to the earlier studies, layoffs made due to reactivity cause negative stock 
returns. (see e.g. Lee 1997, Kashefi & McKee 2002, Hillier, Marshall, McClogan & 
Werema 2007). For example, if the reason is low or decreased demand the reaction has 
been negative (Chen et al. 2001, Palmon et al. 1997). In addition, Ursel and Armstrong-
Stassen (1995) find that investors react more negatively to the first layoff announcement 
than the later announcements and the reaction is also more negative if the layoff is af-
fecting large percentage of the employees than only a small fraction. 
 
Some studies have tried to find out if there is a difference in the reactions between dif-
ferent cultures. For instance, Lee (1997) studies the differences in stock market reac-
tions to layoff announcements between USA and Japan. The results show that in the 
U.S. the reaction is more negative than in Japan. This difference indicates that the cul-
ture and different ways of employing layoffs might affect to investors reactions. Lee 
(1997) also argues that large cross-holdings of especially in Japanese companies may 
affect the market’s response.  
 
Even though the prior studies have not taken into consideration the overall ownership 
structure of the layoffs announcing firm, Filbeck and Webb (2001), however, among 
other things study the effects of insider ownership. They also control for the level of 
institutional ownerships in the sample firms. Their results show that the stock price re-
action to layoff announcements is negative. They also find that firm size is a good proxy 
for information asymmetries. The stock price reaction was more negative in small firms 
than in large firms. This finding indicates that the layoff announcements of small firms 
contain more new information than the announcements for large firms. However, they 
find no significant relation between insider ownership and the price response to layoff 
announcements. 
 
The effect of ownership structure to firm performance has been examined in many ear-
lier studies. However, the impact of ownership structure on stock prices has not been 
studied too much. Researchers have found that different ownership structures affect firm 
performance differently. For example, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find that institu-
tional investors or banks as owners affect positively to firms’ market-to-book values. In 
addition, they find that family, government and corporate owners affect negatively to 
15 
 
the firm value. On the other hand, in contrast to previous findings Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2002) discover that founding-family ownership firms 
perform better than non-family firms.   
 
In addition, Hirschey and Zaima (1989) suggest that ownership structure and insider 
trading activity are seen as useful information by the market when evaluating corporate 
sell-off decisions. Their findings prove that the market reaction to firms’ sell-off deci-
sions is most positive for closely held firms that have experienced insider net-buying six 
months preceding the sell-off announcement. Furthermore, Cohen, Gompers and 
Vuolteenaho (2005) study the reactions of institutional and individual investors to cash 
flow news. They find that individual investors underreact to the cash flow news and 
institutional investors take an advantage of it by buying stocks from individuals when 
positive cash flow news occur. Thus, according to the results of Cohen et al. (2005) in-
stitutional ownership and stock returns seem to correlate.  
 
Moreover, research has shown that large outside shareholders have an impact on firm 
valuation. Bennett (2010) studies how the ownership structure affects the firm valuation 
in case of asset sale announcements. The results show that stock market reaction to cor-
porate sale announcement is significantly positive and bigger for companies that have 
large outside owners than for other studied ownership categories. 
 
 
1.2. Purpose & research hypotheses 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine, does the stock price reaction to layoff 
announcements differ due to different ownership structures of the firms. The focus is on 
those layoff announcements in which the firm first releases the information to the mar-
ket, i.e. when the firm announces that co-determination negotiations are going to start. 
The study is done in the Finnish stock market. Moreover, other interesting aspects are 
studied. For instance, the different growth periods of the economy are taking into con-
sideration when studying the effects. The research questions are:  
 
1. Do the layoff announcements cause abnormal returns in the Finnish 
stock market?   
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2. Is there a difference in the stock market reaction to layoff announce-
ments when taking into consideration the firms’ ownership structure?  
 
In addition to research questions, there are five hypotheses for this study. The first hy-
pothesis is that: 
 
𝐻1: Overall the stock price reaction to layoff announcements is negative in Finland.  
 
The background for hypothesis one is in the findings of previous literature. Most of the 
earlier studies have found negative abnormal returns caused by layoff announcements 
(e.g. Worrell et al. 1991, Lee 1997, Filbeck & Webb 2001, Hillier et al. 2007). The pre-
vious studies are discussed in more detail in the chapter two. Moreover, studies about 
ownership structure and firm value have found that ownership structure affects firm 
valuation (e.g. Thomsen & Pedersen 2000, Bennett 2010). In addition, Bennett (2010) 
finds that ownership structure has an impact in firm valuation in corporate asset sale 
announcements. Thus, considering the purpose of the study the second hypothesis is:  
 
𝐻2: The stock price reaction to layoff announcements diverges between different owner-
ship structure firms.  
 
The firms are classified in different categories based on the ownership structure. A 
firm’s ownership structure is determined in the basis of who is the largest shareholder(s) 
in the company measured by shares and/or votes. The ownership categories are: state 
ownership companies, where the state owns significant amount of the shares, fami-
ly/person owned companies, where the family or person is the largest shareholder, dif-
fusely owned companies where there is no substantial shareholder, concentrated owner-
ship, where significant amount of shares and votes are concentrated to one owner, for-
eign ownership companies and finally institutional ownership companies where an insti-
tution such as pension fund or insurance company is the largest owner .  
 
The research period, 2007–2014, includes different growth phases in the Finnish econ-
omy. The period includes e.g. growth phase 2007, financial crisis 2008 and Euro crisis 
2011–2013 as well as low growth phase 2013–2014. The variability of the growth peri-
ods makes the research period very interesting. Previous studies considering the effect 
of business cycle on market reaction to layoff announcements have found that the reac-
tion is more negative during contraction period than during upturn in the economy (see 
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Elayan, Swales, Maris & Scott 1998, Marshall et al. 2012). Based on earlier findings the 
third hypothesis is: 
 
𝐻3: Layoff announcements that are made during recession period affect more negatively 
to the returns than those made in upturn period.  
 
This study also considers if the size of the layoff has an effect to the abnormal returns. 
Previous studies have found that the magnitude of the layoff is related to the magnitude 
of the stock market reaction: larger layoffs cause more negative stock market reaction 
than smaller ones (see e.g. Worrell et al. 1991, Palmon et al. 1997). Earlier studies have 
also proven that the announced reason for layoff is affecting the stock market reaction 
significantly (e.g. Palmon et al. 1997, Kashefi & McKee 2001). Thus, in this study the 
layoff announcements are also divided into two subsamples to those that are reactive 
(e.g. declining demand) and to those that are proactive (e.g. efficiency enhancing or 
restructuring). Therefore, two additional hypotheses are formed based on earlier find-
ings:  
  
𝐻4: The larger the percentage of firm’s employees under the co-determination negotia-
tions the more negative the stock market reaction is. 
 
𝐻5: Reactive layoff announcements cause more negative stock market reaction than 
proactive.  
 
 
1.3. Data and methodology 
 
The data for this study contains Finnish firms’ layoff announcements during the years 
2007–2014. In addition, the ownership structures of the downsizing firms are needed in 
order to categorize the firms into different ownership subsamples. Moreover, stock pric-
es are used to calculate the returns and abnormal returns that are caused by the layoff 
announcements. This study also considers if the how the layoff reason and the magni-
tude of the layoff is affecting the abnormal returns. Therefore, the announced layoff 
reasons and the amount of employees under the co-determination negotiations are col-
lected from the companies’ announcements.  
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The event study methodology is used in this study to calculate the abnormal returns sur-
rounding the layoff announcements. Many previous studies have used the event study 
procedure in order to find how the stock market reacts to layoff announcements (e.g. 
Worrrell et al.1991, Palmon et al. 1997). In addition, the abnormal returns are tested 
with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression procedure. 
 
 
1.4. Contribution of the study 
 
This study is examining the effects of layoff announcements form a new perspective 
and trying to find out if the stock price reaction differs between different ownership 
structures in the redundancies announcing firms. Previous event studies have not taken 
into account different ownership structures in firms that announce layoffs. Moreover, 
the research is done in the Finnish markets whereas most of the previous studies are 
made in United States or in British markets. Furthermore, the research period contains 
many different growth periods in the Finnish economy which makes it possible to study 
the effect of the business cycle.    
 
 
1.5. Structure of the study 
 
The structure of the study is as follows. After the introduction, the previous literature is 
reviewed in more detail. Third section is the first part of the theoretical background and 
it discusses the stock valuation. The theory part also includes efficient market theory 
and agency problem which are discussed in the section four. The fifth part presents the 
data and methodology used in this study. In the sixth part, the empirical results are pre-
sented. Finally, the last part discusses the conclusions of the study. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although stock price reactions to layoff announcements have been studied quite a bit 
before, still today we can’t say clearly how the market is going to react. This section 
provides deeper look in to the previous studies about layoff announcements effects on 
stock valuation. Furthermore, studies about ownership structure effects on firm perfor-
mance and value are presented in this part.  
 
 
2.1. Layoff announcements and stock returns 
 
The first part of this chapter presents studies that have found negative reactions to layoff 
announcements. Then the second part presents positive findings. In addition, different 
aspects that previous research has studied that might effect to the reactions are presented. 
 
2.1.1. Negative market reactions 
 
Worrell et al. (1991) were the first ones to actually study the investors’ reaction to 
layoff announcements. Earlier researchers have ignored strategic effects of layoffs. The 
studies had examined the effects of layoffs to the workers or the backgrounds of the 
layoffs. Worrell et al. (1991) underline that stock returns reflect information about 
layoff announcements and that companies should see them as strategic events in the 
market. (Worrell et al. 1991.) 
 
Worrell et al. (1991) study 194 layoff announcements over nine years period (1979–
1987) in the US market. They study only the layoff announcements’ effects not the ac-
tual layoffs’. Their research questions are: 
 
1. Do the layoff announcements cause abnormal returns? 
 2. Does the stock market reaction differ due to different announced reason 
in the layoff announcement? 
3. Does different sized layoffs cause different kind of stock market reac-
tions? 
4. Does the expected duration of the layoff affect the stock market reaction? 
5. Does the stock market react differently if there has been leakage of the 
information or not before the layoff announcement? (Worrell et al. 1991.) 
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Worrell et al. (1991) calculate mean cumulative prediction errors (MCPEs) for different 
time intervals surrounding the announcement. MCPEs measure the abnormal stock re-
turns. The market model is used to calculate the normal returns. Moreover, they divide 
the layoff announcements into two different categories based on the stated reason of the 
layoff. The categories are financial distress and restructuring or consolidation.  
 
The results show that for the financial distress category companies the stock price reac-
tion to layoff announcement is negative and significant. According to the results, in the 
11 days’ ([-5, +5]) period the stock prices decrease 2,5%. In turn, if the layoff reason is 
restructuring the reaction is not significantly negative. The results indicate that market 
reacts differently depending on the stated reason of the layoff. In addition, the findings 
show that bigger magnitude layoffs cause more negative abnormal returns than smaller 
size layoffs. Moreover, the reaction is more negative if the layoff is permanent than for 
only temporary layoffs. (Worrell et al. 1991.) 
 
In part of the study’s layoff announcements the information had been leaked in to the 
market before the announcement. Worrell et al. (1991) find weak evidence that the mar-
ket reacts differently if the information has been leaked before the announcement. They 
find marginally significant negative MCPEs also before the announcement if the infor-
mation has leaked. For those firms which have no information leakage the only signifi-
cant MCPE occurs on the announcement date. Overall Worrell’s et al. (1991) findings 
suggest that layoff announcements are seen as negative information by the investors and 
negative abnormal returns are expected to occur. (Worrell et al. 1991.) 
 
Ursel and Armstrong-Strassen (1995) study stock market reactions to layoff announce-
ments in Canadian firms. Their sample includes 137 announcements over the years 
1989–1992. Ursel and Armstrong-Strassen (1995) also examine how the reaction differs 
between the first and following layoff announcements. Moreover, they control for other 
announcements possibly occurring over the two-day period around the layoff an-
nouncements. 
 
The results show that the overall reaction to layoff announcements is negative. Ursel 
and Armstrong-Strassen (1995) also find that larger layoffs cause more negative stock 
price reaction than smaller ones. These findings are similar to Worrell’s et al. (1991). In 
addition, Ursel and Armstrong-Strassen (1995) find that the reaction is more negative 
for the first layoff announcement of a firm than for the following ones. This aspect is 
not considered in Worrell’s et al. (1991) study. 
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Negative market reactions are also found in Lee’s (1997) study. Lee (1997) compares 
the effects of layoff announcements on stock prices between the U.S. and Japan over the 
years 1990–1994. Lee (1997) categorizes the layoff announcements into two groups: 
reactive and proactive layoffs. The reactivity means here that the lay offing firm reacts 
to the worsened stage of the economy by reducing their work force. The proactive 
layoff announcements in turn are part of the firm’s strategy or restructuring. In addition, 
Lee (1997) studies if size, duration or the amount of layoff announcements have an ef-
fect on the reaction. These effects are tested with a multivariate regression model.  
 
An interesting aspect of Lee’s (1997) study is the different attitude towards layoffs in 
the US and Japan. In the U.S. layoffs are important ways for the firms to survive in the 
economic and strategic environment. In Japan in turn, people are used to lifetime em-
ployment which restricts Japanese firms’ strategic layoffs. Furthermore, large cross-
holdings are common in Japanese firms and they might have an impact on the share-
holders’ response on layoff announcements. In Japan large part of shares is held by in-
surance companies or banks who don’t trade frequently. In addition, Lee (1997) states 
that Japanese firms might be owned by long-term investors that simply don’t react to 
the layoff announcements. These kind of shareholdings are seen as patient capital and 
might lead to rather small stock price impact. (Lee 1997.) 
 
The results show that the market reactions to layoff announcements differ between the 
two countries. The investors react more negatively to layoff announcements in the U.S. 
than in Japan. The reaction is negative in both countries. The findings show that the 
reaction is more negative in the U.S. markets if the layoff is reactive and the bigger the 
layoffs are. Positive returns are not detected in Lee’s (1997) findings. 
 
According to Elayan, Swales, Maris and Scott (1998), the stock price reaction to layoff 
announcements can depend on the information about the financial performance of the 
downsizing company. If investors see the layoffs as a way to improve efficiency and 
competitiveness a positive market reaction would be expected. On the other hand, the 
reaction can be negative if the firm’s future growth and investment opportunities are 
seen worse than assumed. In addition to market reactions to layoff announcements 
Elayan et al. (1998) study the effectiveness of layoffs. They also study other layoff 
characteristics such as layoff size, if the layoff is anticipated or unanticipated and rea-
sons for layoff and how these factors affect the stock price reaction. Their sample in-
cludes 646 layoff announcements over the period 1979–1991. (Elayan et al. 1998.) 
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Despite the hypothesis that positive abnormal returns would be expected in case of effi-
ciency improving layoffs, Elayan et al. (1998) find only significant negative abnormal 
returns. This finding suggests that layoff announcements give negative information 
about the downsizing firm and possibly indicating that the firm’s investment or growth 
opportunities or future cash flows have decreased. Elayan et al. (1998) also find that 
large magnitude layoffs have more negative reaction that small ones. Furthermore, the 
industry type has a significant effect on the reaction. Companies in which the human 
capital plays important role are affected more negatively by layoff announcement than 
firms in which the physical capital is more important. (Elayan et al. 1998.) 
 
Chen, Mehtora, Sivakumar and Yu (2001) study layoff announcements effects on stock 
prices and on the financial performance after layoffs. Their study examines 349 layoff 
announcements from 1990 to 1995 in the U.S. markets. The period under investigation 
starts from recession and ends to upswing in the U.S. economy. The reasons behind 
studied layoffs vary from declined demand, cost cutting, low profits to restructuring. 
Chen et al. (2001) run a multiple regression analysis to study the informational content 
of layoff announcements. 
 
The results show that layoff announcements have significant negative effect on stock 
returns. The two-day average abnormal return related to layoff announcements is -1,2 %. 
The reaction is more negative if the layoff reason is declined demand. On the other hand, 
if the reason is restructuring the abnormal returns are not significant. Moreover, if the 
layoffs are expected the reaction is weaker. In addition, Chen et al. (2001) find that poor 
stock price and operating performance precede layoffs. After the layoffs both stock 
price and operating performance are improved. (Chen et al. 2001.) 
 
Many of the previous papers have suggested that the stated reason for the announced 
layoffs is influencing the stock price reaction. Filbeck and Webb (2001) instead study 
how managerial ownership is affecting to the share price response to the layoff an-
nouncements. They also control how the magnitude of the layoff, firm size, level of 
institutional ownership and profitability are affecting to the reaction. The sample in-
cludes 366 layoff announcements from the U.S. companies over the years 1990–1997. 
The first hypothesis of the study is based on the findings of many previous studies. It 
states that layoff announcements cause negative abnormal returns. In addition, Filbeck 
and Webb (2001) suggest that higher level of insider ownership has positive effect on 
the stock price reaction to the layoff announcements. They state that high level of man-
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agerial ownership is signaling to shareholders that the announced layoffs are proactive 
way to increase shareholder value. 
 
Overall, Filbeck and Webb (2001) find significant and negative stock price reaction to 
layoff announcements. In the time interval from day -1 to 0 the average cumulative ab-
normal return is -1,15 % with Z-statistic of -3,94 and for the interval of -1 to +1 -1,24 % 
with Z-statistic of -3,20. Thus, the results support the first hypothesis of the study. 
Moreover, Filbeck and Webb (2001) run different OLS regression models to detect the 
impacts of the control variables on abnormal returns. They find that the reaction is more 
negative the larger the magnitude of the layoff is. The reaction is also found to be de-
pendent on the size firm size. Layoff announcements made by small firms lead to larger 
and more negative stock price reactions. However, Filbeck and Webb (2001) do not 
discover significant relationship between insider ownership or institutional ownership 
and stock price reaction to layoff announcements. 
 
Most of the studies examining layoff announcements effects on stock prices have con-
sidered the U.S. market. However, Hillier, Marshall, McColgan and Werema (2007) 
study layoff announcements effects in UK market. They also study the financial per-
formance of the downsizing firms surrounding permanent layoff announcements.  322 
layoff announcements of companies listed in the London Stock Exchange are included 
in the sample. The study period is 1990–2000. Hillier et al. (2007) calculate the abnor-
mal stock returns with the market-adjusted model.  
 
Hillier et al. (2007) show that employee layoffs are followed by poor stock price and 
operating performance. This finding is similar to Chen’s et al. (2001) findings. The 
layoffs are found to occur more likely in more diversified and more indebted companies 
than their industry peers. However, Hillier et al. (2007) don’t find improvements in op-
erating performance after the layoffs. Instead, the employee productivity and corporate 
focus is improved after the layoffs. Furthermore, they find that the stock market re-
sponse to the layoffs announcements is significantly negative. Especially layoffs that 
originate from firms’ bad financial condition cause negative reaction. The finding is 
similar as for example in Lee’s (1997) study: reactive layoff announcements cause 
negative stock price reaction and proactive announcements cause only small insignifi-
cant reaction. The mean three-day cumulative abnormal return on the announcement 
date is -081 %. For plant closure layoff announcements, the mean three-day CARs are -
2,12 % and for loss making operations announcements -2,34 %.  
 
24 
 
2.1.2. Positive and negative market reactions 
 
In contrary to previous studies, positive abnormal returns are found in Palmon, Sun and 
Tang’s (1997) study. They study the stated reasons of the layoffs and their relationship 
with the abnormal returns of the announcement date. Palmon et al. (1997) use same 
kind of categories as Worrell et al. (1991): bad market condition or decreased demand 
and efficiency-enhancing. Palmon et al. (1997) state that layoffs are among many other 
corporate decisions linked to either a decline or an increase in expected future firm val-
ue and financial performance. They show that the stated reasons of layoffs are useful 
signs for investors since they convey information about the future profitability of the lay 
offing company (Palmon et al. 1997). 
 
Palmon et al. (1997) study 140 layoff announcements published in the Wall Street Jour-
nal and New York Times newspapers over the years 1982–1990. The hypotheses of the 
study are: 
𝐻1: The abnormal stock returns for firms that state adverse market condi-
tion (efficiency enhancing) for the reason of layoffs should be negative 
(positive). 
𝐻2: The magnitude of the abnormal returns should be in direct relationship 
with the magnitude of the layoffs. 
𝐻3: The future profitability and sales are worse for the firms that announce 
an adverse market condition as a reason for layoffs than for the firms that 
declare efficiency enhancing as a layoff reason. (Palmon et al. 1997.) 
 
Palmon et al. (1997) calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for three different 
periods around the announcement date. The CARs are calculated with the market model. 
In addition, Palmon et al. (1997) examine the cumulative abnormal returns with an OLS 
regression model that controls for firm size and layoff size. 
 
According to the results, the layoff announcements that have declined demand as the 
reason for layoff lead to negative abnormal returns. Moreover, if the cited reason for 
layoff is efficiency enhancing, layoffs are seen as an effective cost-cutting method that 
increases the value of the firm and as a consequence cause positive abnormal returns. 
Thus, it seems that the cited reason for layoffs affects strongly to the market reaction. 
These findings support the first hypothesis of the study. According to the findings, also 
the other two hypotheses are accepted. (Palmon et al. 1997.) The findings are significant 
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since earlier studies had not found positive abnormal returns related with layoff an-
nouncements.  
 
Positive stock market reactions are also found by Kashefi and McKee (2002). Kashefi 
and McKee (2002) study 174 layoff announcements made by U.S. companies over sev-
en years (1992–1998). The layoff announcements are divided into reactive and proac-
tive. In Kashefi and McKee’s (2002) study a layoff announcement is considered as pro-
active (positive) when it is associated with increasing sales growth and growth of earn-
ings per share (EPS) and reactive (negative) if company has declining sales growth and 
lower earnings per share. The sample includes 105 proactive announcements and 69 
reactive announcements. The hypothesis states that layoff announcements give useful 
information about future free cash flows and the valuation of companies.  
 
The findings show that proactive announcements cause positive average abnormal re-
turn of 0,986 % on the announcement date. Reactive announcements in turn cause nega-
tive average abnormal return of -0,683 %. The plot of cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) shows that the information is leaked to the market before the an-
nouncement. In addition, for the proactive announcement the CAAR continues increas-
ing after the announcement date which suggests that layoff announcements were not 
fully anticipated. Kashefi and McKee’s (2002) results are in line with previous studies 
although the cumulative average abnormal returns are bigger. (Kashefi & McKee 2002.) 
 
Hahn and Reyes (2004) also find that stock price reaction to layoff announcements de-
pends on the stated reason of the layoff. Their study examines layoff announcements 
that concern more than 1000 workers over the years 1995–1999 in USA. The final sam-
ple consists of 36 firms announcing layoffs due to low demand and 42 firms downsizing 
because of restructuring. Hahn and Reyes (2004) use different regression models such 
as ordinary least squares and EGARCH to test the returns. The results show that low 
demand layoff announcements cause negative abnormal returns. Positive abnormal re-
turns are detected if the layoff reason is restructuring. The cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) for the restructuring sample is 1,9 % on the announcement date. Moreo-
ver, Hahn and Reyes (2004) test information content of the layoff announcements with 
different control variables e.g. layoff-ratio, layoff reason and industry. However, they 
find that the layoff reason is only significant factor influencing the market reaction.  
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2.1.3. Effects of the business cycle on the stock market reactions to layoff announce-
ments 
 
This study takes into consideration the effects of business cycle in market reactions to 
layoff announcements. Previous studies have shown that the recession the stock market 
reacts more negatively to announcements of layoffs. 
 
Elayan et al. (1998) study if the business cycle has an effect to the stock price reactions 
to layoff announcements. They hypothesize that layoff announcements during contrac-
tion period of the economy cause more negative reactions than those made during ex-
pansion period. Their sample includes 420 layoff announcements made during expan-
sion period and 183 announcements made during contraction. The results are in line 
with the hypothesis. Announcements during expansion cause cumulative average ab-
normal returns (CAARs) of -0,476 % and announcements during contraction lead to 
CAARs of -1,282%. Both of the findings are statistically significant.  
 
Marshall, McColgan and McLeish (2012) study layoff announcements during the global 
financial crisis 2008 and during rising markets in 2005 and 2006 in UK market. They 
expect that stock market will react negatively to layoff announcements during crisis 
period 2008. This expectation comes from earlier studies that have found negative reac-
tions for firm’s that downsize due to declining investment opportunities. They also hy-
pothesize that the market reaction is positive during the rising stock market in 2005 and 
2006 because the layoffs are probably viewed as efficiency enhancing during stable 
product markets. The sample includes 67 layoff announcements in upturn period 2005–
2006 and 78 announcements during the year 2008. (Marshall et al. 2012.) 
 
According to the results, the market reaction to layoff announcements during upswing 
market 2005–2006 is positive and significant causing cumulative abnormal returns of 
0,51%. As expected, the reaction to layoff announcements made during financial crisis 
is significantly negative (-1,75%). The reaction is negative in 2008 despite the reason 
for layoff. (Marshall et al. 2012.) 
  
 
2.2. Ownership structure and firm value 
 
This section presents studies handling different ownership structures and how they af-
fect to share prices. There are several papers with different perspectives studying the 
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effects of corporate ownership structure on the performance or value of the firm. The 
aim is to show that the firm value or performance can differ due to different ownership 
structures of firms. 
 
Hirschey and Zaima (1989) study whether investors consider the recent insider trading 
pattern and ownership structure of the firm as useful for evaluating corporate sell-offs. 
The hypothesis is that closely held firms’ corporate sell-off decisions combined with 
recent net-buying of insiders are followed by positive stock price reaction. And on the 
contrary the widely held firm’s sell-off decisions combined with recent insider net-
selling lead to much less positive market reaction. Here closely held firms are defined as 
firms where insiders own at least five percent of the shares. In addition, a firm is con-
sidered as widely held if the insiders own less than five percent of the shares. Hirschey 
and Zaima (1989) use event study methodology to study the impacts of the sell-off deci-
sions on the valuation. The investigation period starts from 1975 and ends to 1982.  
 
Hirschey and Zaima’s (1989) main finding is that investors actually seem to consider 
insider trading and ownership structure as useful information when evaluating the cor-
porate sell-off decisions. The market reaction to the sell-off decisions is found to be 
most positive for the closely held firms that have experienced insider net-buying six 
months preceding the announcement. For the widely held firms the reaction to sell-off 
announcements combined with insider net-selling activity is neutral. (Hirschey & Zaima 
1989.) 
 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) study how ownership structure affects firm performance 
in 435 largest European companies over the years 1990–1995. The ownership structures 
of the companies are classified based on the largest shareholder of the company. There 
are five ownership categories in the study: institutional investor, bank, non-financial 
company, family/person and government. Economic performance is measured with as-
set returns and the shareholder value is evaluated with market-to-book ratio. Thomsen 
and Pedersen (2000) also control for industry and nation effects. 
 
Their first hypothesis is that the performance of a company is a bell-shaped (increasing 
first and then decreasing) function of the ownership stake of the biggest owner. The 
second hypothesis states that the creation of shareholder value will be greater if the 
largest owner is a financial institution. Then, the third hypothesis is that if the largest 
shareholder is an institution, shareholder value increases with the ownership. Finally, 
the fourth hypothesis says that ceteris paribus, if the largest owner is an institution the 
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sales growth will be lower than for other ownership classes. (Thomsen & Pedersen 
2000.) 
 
According to the results, firms that have bank or institutional investor as a largest owner 
tend to have higher market-to-book values. Other categories, family, government and 
corporate ownership have negative influence on the market-to-book value when com-
paring to the institutional investors. From this finding one can interpret that those own-
ers might have more nonprofit goals than do financial institutions as investors. Thus, if 
government would privatize and families let go their control shareholder value might be 
created. The same kind of findings are detected with return on assets (ROA). However, 
sales growth is found to be the higher for family or another company ownership catego-
ries. Thomsen and Pedersen’s (2000) results are in line with assumptions such as family 
owners want to ensure the long-run persistence of their company. Governments as own-
ers instead have different goals. They for example, consider social welfare and em-
ployment as important values. Moreover, corporate owners want to achieve corporate 
growth and transactions. (Thomsen & Pedersen 2000.) 
 
Cohen, Gompers and Vuolteenaho (2005) compare how institutional and independent 
investors react to cash flow news. The background for this study comes from previous 
studies that suggest that firm-level stock prices tend to underreact to future cash flow 
news. Prior literature also shows that stock returns and institutional investors’ buying 
are correlated. The data for the study consists of publicly traded US companies’ quarter-
ly reports from 1980 to 1999. Vector autoregression (VAR) model is used to study the 
differences in investors’ behavior. Cohen’s et al. (2005) main purpose is to measure the 
institutional ownership response to cash flow news.  
 
Their main finding is that institutional investors utilize the underreaction and buy (sell) 
stocks from individual investors when positive (negative) cash flow news occur. The 
VAR results show that 25 percent cash flow news lead to institutions purchasing two 
percent of the outstanding shares. They also find that institutional investors don’t follow 
momentum strategy. Instead they follow cash-flow-momentum strategies. In addition, 
institutions sell 5 % of their stocks to individual investors when the share price rises 25 % 
without any related cash flow news. (Cohen et al 2005.) 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) in turn study the relationship between the founding-family 
ownership and firm performance in S&P 500 firms in 1992–1999. Founding-family 
owners differ from other investors due to their poorly diversified portfolios and long-
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term investments. Prior literature had mostly found poor performance with family own-
ership firms. However, concentrated large shareholders might benefit the firm by aim-
ing to different objectives like firm growth, technological innovation or survival of the 
firm. (Anderson & Reeb 2003.)  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) measure the firm performance by ROA, EBITDA and To-
bin’s q. They use a two-way fixed effects model to measure the relation between the 
ownership and performance. In addition, firm characteristics and industry are controlled 
in the regressions.  
 
In contrary to Thomsen and Pedersen (2003) findings about the performance of family 
firms, Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) findings show that founding-family companies per-
form better than nonfamily ownership companies. The findings are significant both 
economically and statistically with all of the performance measures. For example, To-
bin’s q is found to be approximately 10 % higher for family firms than for nonfamily 
firms. The performance is found to be better if the CEO is a family member than with 
outsider CEO. All in all, Anderson and Reeb’s (2003) results show that in well-
regulated and transparent markets the ownership of families reduces agency problems 
and leads to better firm performance. 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2005) also study how family ownership, control and management 
affect firm value. Their sample includes 508 firms listed on the Fortune-500 during the 
years 1994–2000. 37% of the sample firms are family firms. They define the family 
firms as: “Firm whose founder or a member of the family by either blood or marriage is 
an officer, a director, or the owner of at least 5% of the firm’s equity, individually or as 
a group”. The value of the firms is measured with Tobin’s q which is the ratio of firm’s 
market value to total assets. In here Tobin’s q is calculated as market-to-book value. 
(Villalonga & Amit 2005.) 
 
Villalonga and Amit 2005 find similar results as Anderson and Reeb (2003). The results 
show that the mean Tobin’s q for family companies is 2,17 and for non-family firms it 
is 1,95. Thus, family firms perform better. Villalonga and Amit (2005) also divide the 
family firms into three different categories based on what kind of family ownership or 
lead firm has. Type I family firm has CEO from the family (founder or descendant) and 
control-enhancing mechanisms. Type II family firms don’t have family member as a 
CEO but have control-enhancing mechanisms. Type III family firms have family mem-
ber as a CEO but don’t have control-enhancing mechanisms. Those firms that don’t 
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have either of the mentioned are categorized as nonfamily firms. After the categoriza-
tion it is found that the family ownership creates value only with certain control of fami-
ly and management. For example, value is created when the CEO is the founder or the 
chairman. However, if the CEO is descendant the value is demolished. In addition, the 
firm value is approximately 25 percent higher for firms that have founder as a CEO and 
control-enhancing mechanisms than for non-family firms. (Villalonga & Amit 2005.) 
 
Bennett (2010) studies, does corporate ownership structure affect firm valuation in case 
of asset sale announcements. In his study the sample firms are classified into three dif-
ferent ownership structures: large outside ownership, large insider ownership and wide-
ly held firms. The market reaction is examined with event study methodology. Moreo-
ver, the cumulative abnormal returns are tested with a dummy variable regression in 
order to detect the differences between the ownership structure groups.   
 
The main finding of Bennett’s (2010) study is that the ownership structure affects the 
firm performance. The stock market reaction to asset sale announcement is significantly 
bigger for large outside ownership companies than for other ownership categories. In 
addition, the reaction is positive and significant for the large outside ownership sample 
for the both the selling and buying firms. Widely held and large insider ownership sam-
ples experience negative market reaction but only for the widely held sample the reac-
tion is significant. For the selling firm the findings are quite similar. One difference is 
that the stock market reaction for widely held sample is not significant. (Bennett 2010.) 
 
Bennett (2010) also investigates that does the ownership structure of the firm other side 
of the deal is affecting to the reaction. One finding is that firms that deal with large in-
side shareholder firms experience lower stock price reaction than dealing with other 
ownership structure companies. In addition, the effect of the disclosure price to the reac-
tion is studied. In contrary to prior research no effect is found. All in all, Bennet’s (2010) 
findings indicate that large outside owners might have positive effect on the firm per-
formance due to their power of monitoring the management.   
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3. STOCK VALUATION 
 
When studying some event’s or announcement’s effects on stock prices the most im-
portant and relevant theoretical frameworks are stock price formation and efficient mar-
ket theory. In this section stock valuation is discussed. Purpose of this section is to ex-
plain which factors affect the value of stock and why stock price might change after 
layoff announcement and how different factors impact on the price. Second part of the 
chapter presents some common stock valuation models. The presented models are fun-
damental.  
 
The salaries of employees can be seen as debt or fixed costs because they have to be 
paid even if the financial condition of a firm is poor. Consequently, when being in a 
financial distress a high debt company can either reduce their debt or other fixed costs 
or alternatively cut the salary costs (meaning lay offing) to improve the financial condi-
tion. Probably reducing debt or for example closing plants is much harder than cutting 
employee costs.  
 
The magnitude of debt in a firm affects to the required return of the stock which in turn 
affects to the price of the security. The more debt firm has the bigger the required rate of 
return should be (Modigliani & Miller 1958). According to Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958) theory, the relation of rate of return and debt can be seen in the following equa-
tion: 
 
(1)  𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟0 + (𝑟0 − 𝑟𝐷)
𝐷
𝐸
 , where 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = expected return for stock i 
𝑟0 = return for stock of zero debt firm 
𝑟𝐷 = return for stock of firm with debt 
𝐷
𝐸
  = debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
When the debt ratio of a firm increases the beta of the firm’s stock rises and due to that 
the expected return increases. The relation of expected return and beta can be seen from 
the equation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) below (Bodie et al. 2014: 297). 
 
(2)  𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑀) − 𝑟𝑓], where 
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𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = expected return for stock i 
𝑟𝑓 = risk-free return 
𝛽𝑖 = beta for stock i 
𝐸(𝑟𝑀) = expected return for the market portfolio. 
 
Thus, reducing debt should lower the required rate of return of stock. Based on the stock 
valuation models we can say that the rising of required rate of return affects negatively 
to the stock price. Consequently, replacing debt reducing with layoffs the required rate 
of return decreases and thus, the stock price should increase.  
 
Layoffs can also affect to the dividend expectations. When a firm cuts the employee 
costs more money is left for the distribution of dividends. In that case the dividend ex-
pectations are assumed to be increasing. When investors are expecting larger dividends 
the value of the stock increases. The connection of dividend expectations and required 
rate of return is described in the dividend based stock valuation models presented in this 
chapter.  
 
 
3.1. Common stock valuation models 
 
Valuation of stocks is not simple. Companies have no obligations to pay anything for 
the investors unlike they have to pay for the creditors. This is causing uncertainty in 
valuation. In addition, future cash flows are unknown and due to that they need to be 
somehow estimated and forecasted. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2014: 93.) Thus, the value of 
stock is the present value of the future cash flows. It is determined the same way as the 
value of bonds. However, estimating future cash flows is more difficult for stocks be-
cause the revenues are dividends and dividends depend on the future success of the 
company. Moreover, the maturity of stocks is causing more difficulties in the valuation 
because it is assumed to be perpetual. Estimating cash flows to perpetuity is not possible 
in practice. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 141.) Regardless of the difficulties 
dividend based models are widely used in valuation. Moreover, they are theoretically 
best way to value stocks because dividends are only cash flows that investors can re-
ceive from companies (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 149–150). Equation 1 presents the basic 
dividend discount model. 
 
 (3)   𝑃0 =
𝐷1
1+𝑟
+
𝐷2
(1+𝑟)2
+
𝐷3
(1+𝑟)3
+ ⋯ 
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According to the equation, the present value of the stock 𝑃0 is the sum of future divi-
dends 𝐷𝑡 discounted with the required rate of return 𝑟. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 150.) If 
the future dividends are expected to stay constant the equation becomes:  
 
(4)  𝑃0 =
𝐷1
𝑟
  
 
If the growth speed of the dividends is assumed to be constant the equation is as follows: 
 
(5)   𝑃0 =
𝐷1
𝑟−𝑔
 , 
 
where 𝑔 is the growth speed of dividends. Based on the equation we can say that the 
faster the growth of dividends the higher the present value of the stock is. The equation 
is called Gordon’s growth model (constant growth dividend discount model). (Nikkinen 
et al. 2002: 150.) The Gordon’s growth model has three expectations: 
 
1. The stream of dividends is perpetual. 
2. The dividends grow with speed g. 
3. The required rate r is bigger than the growth speed g. (Fuller & Farrell 1987: 276–
277.) 
 
The value of stock can be also calculated with free cash flow (FCF) model. It is based 
on calculating the current value of firm’s free cash flows. Thus, instead of dividends the 
free cash flows are discounted to measure the value of stock. Comparing to the dividend 
based model and other profit based models advantages of using FCF model are that the 
dividend policy and accounting differences don’t affect the value. In practice the model 
is used similarly as for example the dividend discount model. The equation of FCF 
model is as follows (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 152–153.): 
 
(6)  𝑃0 =  
𝐹𝐶𝐹1
1+𝑟
+
𝐹𝐶𝐹2
(1+𝑟)2
+
𝐹𝐶𝐹3
(1+𝑟)3
+ ⋯  
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4. MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
Another important theoretical aspect related to the research problem is the efficiency of 
the financial markets. According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices should 
reflect all relevant information that’s available in the market (Fama 1970). Thus, the 
prices should be correct and investors should immediately react to new information. 
Announced layoffs tell important information about the present and expected future 
financial condition of the downsizing firm. From the investors perspective these an-
nouncements should be taken into consideration when thinking about the future cash 
flows and growth opportunities of the firm. Thus, the expected financial condition of the 
firm is being valued by the market when new information is announced.  
 
This section discusses the idea of efficient markets in Fama’s (1970) framework and 
focuses on the semi-strong form market efficiency. Moreover, the agency problem and 
information asymmetry are discussed in this section. 
 
 
4.1. Efficient market hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis expects that the financial markets are informatively 
efficient. They reflect all available information in the markets. Moreover, the infor-
mation should be available for every market participant in all times. In the efficient 
markets all participants should also react in the same way to the information appearing 
on the market. Thus, nobody can earn abnormal returns. (Fama 1970.)  
 
According to the hypothesis, stock prices should always change when new relevant in-
formation appears. Therefore, when, for example, layoff announcements are published 
the effects should be immediately seen in the prices. The figure 1 compares the price 
reaction to positive information in efficient and inefficient markets. The upper line illus-
trates the efficient reaction and the lower presents the inefficient one. As can be seen the 
efficient market reaction is instant and the effects of the event are included to the price 
immediately. In the inefficient reaction it takes time that the stock price reflects the real 
value of the company. 
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Cumulative return 
 
 
 
Time  
Figure 1. The efficient market reaction versus the slow reaction. (after Knüpfer & Puttonen 
2014: 166.) 
 
 
The reaction can be also biased upwards or downwards if the market is inefficient. Un-
derreaction has been detected for example after earnings announcements (see. Bernard 
& Thomas 1989). Ball and Brown (1968) note that even after the earnings announce-
ment the cumulative abnormal returns continue to drift. These findings are speaking 
against the idea of the efficient financial market.  
 
New information is never anticipated. Therefore, stock prices are changing unpredicta-
bly. This is called the random walk theory. According to the random walk theory, the 
price changes are random and can’t be predicted. Consequently, in the efficient market 
yesterday’s return doesn’t tell anything about today’s return. (Nikkinen et al. 2002:82.) 
Kendall (1953) was the first one to bring up the idea of random walk. He studies stock 
and commodity prices and find no patterns in the prices. Kendall (1953) notices that the 
data behaves like a wandering series.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis has been studied since the year 1900. However, the idea 
of dividing the efficiency in to three forms became popular not until 1950, when the 
area of study was more developed. (Keane 1983: 11.) In addition to the research of the 
efficiency, overall the efficiency of financial market has improved significantly over the 
recent decades, which is mostly due to internet. Nowadays anybody can get information 
fast and cheap whereas before it was only available for large investors. (Nikkinen et al. 
2002: 82.) 
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4.2. Three forms of market efficiency 
 
Often the market efficiency is classified in to different categories based on what kind of 
information prices include. Fama (1970) categorized the market efficiency in three 
forms: weak, semi-strong and strong form market efficiency.  
 
In the weak form efficient market stock prices contain information only about historical 
prices Fama (1970). Thus, nobody can earn excess returns by looking at yesterday’s 
prices. The weak form market efficiency can be tested with technical analysis. Tech-
nical analysis studies realized past prices in order to find price patterns. If the market 
reacted to new information slowly enough price patterns could be found. However, if 
the market is efficient in the weak form, technical analysis is useless when making in-
vestment decisions. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83). Researchers have tested the weak form 
efficiency by testing if some trading rules are working in the market.  
 
The semi-strong market efficiency means that the stock prices contain all the publicly 
available information. If the market is semi-strong form efficient no one can earn excess 
returns using public information. Publicly available information is, for example, annual 
reports or announcements of companies. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri 2005: 355.) To 
test the semi-strong form market efficiency researchers have studied how fast the mar-
ket reacts to different news or public announcements. This can be done by calculating 
the abnormal returns around the studied event date. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2014: 318).  
 
The most efficient form, the strong-form efficiency of the market is reached if the prices 
contain public as well as insider information. Thus, nobody can receive excess returns 
using any information even insider information. (Copeland et al. 2005: 355.) The strong 
market efficiency has been studied by testing if professional mutual funds outperform 
the market (Brealey et al. 2014: 319). 
 
The different market efficiency stages are dependent on each other. If the market is effi-
cient on semi-strong level, it has to be efficient on the weak level too. Thereby also the 
strong form efficient market has to be efficient on the two lower levels, otherwise the 
prices wouldn’t include all relevant information. (Keane 1983: 11.) The figure 2 
demonstrates the relations of market efficiencies.  
 
Many research results show that financial markets would be efficient on the semi-strong 
level but doesn’t fill the strong form efficiency. Thus, according to these results, insid-
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ers can earn excess returns. (Copeland et al. 2005: 373, 389.) Not even the U.S. market 
seem to fill the strong form efficiency although it has been considered the most efficient 
one in the world (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 86). Fama (1970) suggests that the strong form 
doesn’t necessarily describe the real world but it can be rather used as a help when 
comparing deviations from the market efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The three market efficiency forms (after Nikkinen et al. 2002: 84). 
 
 
The most relevant market efficiency form for this thesis is the semi-strong form market 
efficiency because layoff announcements are both new and publicly available infor-
mation. The strong form efficiency is not applicable hence we can’t assume that every-
one has the same amount of information available. Information asymmetry is discussed 
later in this chapter. The semi-strong efficiency is tested with event study methodology, 
which is presented in chapter five.  
 
4.2.1. Criticism about the semi-strong market efficiency  
 
A lot of criticism have been presented about the efficient market hypothesis. Many 
economists have claimed that share prices are at least partly predictable based on past 
price patterns and some fundamental measures and hence investors can earn excess re-
turns by predicting prices (Malkiel 2003). In addition, researchers have found anomalies 
that can be utilized to achieve abnormal returns. In finance, anomalies are long-lasting 
Strong form 
 
Semi-strong form 
Weak 
form 
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deviations from the market efficiency. Their existence can’t be fully explained. 
(Knüpfer & Puttonen 2004: 172.) 
 
Most studies testing the semi-strong market efficiency have been studied the speed of 
stock market participants’ reaction to new published information. When studying the 
particular market efficiency level also the accuracy of the reaction should be taken into 
account.  Empirical findings have often suggested that the reaction to new information 
is fast but the market doesn’t always assimilate new information correctly. (Fuller & 
Faller 1987: 99.) Based on these findings the prices aren’t fully reflecting publicly 
available information. 
 
 
4.3. Information asymmetries and agency theory 
 
In a situation where a company lays off their work force, the management of the com-
pany is expected to have better knowledge of the motives behind the layoffs than inves-
tors. This is called asymmetric information problem. The problem of asymmetric infor-
mation arises when some have better or more information than others (Copeland et al. 
2005: 415).   
 
A good example of information asymmetry is Akerlof’s (1970) model about purchasing 
and selling used cars. In Akerlof’s (1970) example there are four types of cars, bad 
(“lemon”) or good ones and new and old ones. The buyers don’t know if the cars are 
good or bad before they have used them for a while. Asymmetric information arises 
when the owner or seller has more information about the car than the possible buyer. 
Despite the quality of the car, they are sold in the same price, because the potential buy-
er can’t know if it is a good or bad car. In a result the seller can’t receive the true value 
of the car. Based on this example one can interpret that also the financial market under-
values good opportunities and overvalue bad ones. In addition, management like car 
sellers clearly have more information about the true value of the firm than the outside 
equity owners.  
 
In private family owned firms the information asymmetry is small. In contrast, the 
asymmetry is large in publicly traded diffusely owned companies. In between there are 
publicly traded concentrated ownership companies in which the asymmetry might also 
be big. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2014: 22.) 
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The management makes the decisions and acts as an agent for the investors which are 
the principals. The possible differing interests of management and investors may lead to 
inefficient allocation of recourses in a firm. This is called the agency problem or the 
principal-agent problem. (Copeland et al. 2005: 415.) When managers (agents) and 
owners (principals) have different interests and both are maximizing their own utility 
the problem arises. Principals can limit the actions of agents with incentives and by in-
curring monitoring costs limiting the unwanted actions of agents. The costs that result 
from monitoring and divergent interests of principals and agents are called the agency 
costs. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency cots include monitoring costs 
by the principals, bonding expenditures by the agent and the residual loss. (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976.)   
 
The agency problem is important when considering the ownership structure of firms. In 
diffusely owned companies the separation of the management and control are causing 
agency problems (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In contrast, in family owned companies 
where the management is part of the family, the use of power is naturally the easiest 
because the interests between management and owners are not dissenting (Knüpfer & 
Puttonen 2014: 21).  
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5. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
This part presents the data and discusses methodology used in this study. First, the data 
is reviewed in more detail and then the event study methodology is presented.  
 
 
5.1. Data 
 
As mentioned earlier the needed data components for this study are the layoff an-
nouncements, historical stock prices and the ownership structures of the redundancies 
announcing companies. The returns for the stocks are calculated using the historical 
prices. The study is done in the Finnish stock market using Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
Stock Exchange listed stocks data. The research period is seven years starting from the 
beginning of January 2007 and ending to December 2014.  
 
The sample includes 186 layoff announcements. The announcements are gathered from 
Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), Nasdaq Central Storage Facility, 
Kauppalehti and Talouselämä databases. The sample firms are divided into portfolios 
by the ownership structure to examine the differences in reactions. There are eight own-
ership categories used in this study: concentrated, diffused, family/person, state, institu-
tional, foreign and others such as cooperatives and foundations that don’t belong in any 
of the previous categories. Layoff announcing firms are divided into different ownership 
categories based on the largest shareholder as for example in Thomsen and Pedersen’s 
(2000) study. The ownership data is taken from the annual reports, companies’ websites 
or either from Orbis database depending on the data availability at closest date available 
to the layoff announcement.   
 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) determine concentrated ownership as 
having an ultimate owner who owns at least 20 percent of the voting rights. They argue 
that the 20 percent is justifiable to use because it is generally enough to achieve effec-
tive control of a company. All other firms that don’t have an ultimate owner are classi-
fied as widely held in La Porta et al. (1999) study. In this study the companies are also 
classified as concentrated ownership companies if the largest owner owns at least 20% 
of the shares and/or the votes. Other firms in which the largest owner own less than 20% 
of the shares are classified as diffusely owned. 103 of the sample observations are cate-
gorized as concentrated and 83 as diffused based on the 20% rule.  
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In addition, the firms are divided into different ownership structure categories based on 
who is the largest owner in the firm. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) use similar classifi-
cation method in their study. A firm that has family or person as a largest shareholder 
are classified in to the family/person category. 73 of the sample layoff announcements 
are made by firm that has person or family as a largest shareholder. The shares can be 
owned directly or indirectly through a firm. Moreover, a firm is considered as a state 
owned if the state owns significant amount of the shares and as an institutional owned if 
an institution such as pension funds and insurance companies is the largest shareholder. 
28 of the sample layoff announcements are made by companies that have state as a larg-
est owner and 19 announcements made by institutionally owned companies. Further-
more, a firm is categorized as foreign owned if the largest owner is foreign. 20 of the 
sample firms are made by foreign ownership firms. 
 
In some of the sample companies where the largest owner’s ownership stake is not sub-
stantial (under 5%). Owner that owns at least five percent is considered as large block 
shareholder (Financial Times 2016). Therefore, these companies where the largest own-
er owns under five percent of the shares is not classified into any of the groups other 
than widely owned companies. There are 25 layoff announcements made by firms in 
which the largest owner owns under five percent of the shares. In addition, there are 21 
layoff announcements made by firms where the largest owner is a co-operative or some 
other organization that could not be categorized in to family/person, state, foreign or 
institutional ownership category. These announcements are just classified into concen-
trated or widely held companies.  
 
The sample layoff announcements are also classified into two different categories based 
on the layoff reason. The two subsamples are proactive layoff announcements such as 
efficiency enhancing or restructuring and reactive layoff announcements which are reac-
tions to decreased demand or adverse market conditions. Moreover, in order to study the 
impact of recession the layoff announcements are divided into two subsamples based on 
whether they are made during recession or not. The next chapter discusses the economic 
growth periods in more detail. The table 1 shows how many layoff announcements (LA) 
are in different ownership categories and how many of them are reactive or proactive 
and which of them are made during recession. 
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Table 1. Number of layoff announcements in different categories. 
  Concentrated Diffused 
Fami-
ly/person State Foreign Institutional 
Number of LAs 103 83 73 28 20 19 
 
Number of 
Reactive LAs 53 41 43 17 10 8 
 
Number of 
Proactive LAs 47 41 30 11 7 10 
 
Number of  
LAs During 
Recession 62 48 45 18 12 13 
 
 
Furthermore, some restrictions have been made to the data. First, the layoff announce-
ments that consider under 50 persons have been left out from the sample in order to en-
sure that the layoffs are economically significant. Moreover, firms that have made other 
important announcements such as earnings or dividend announcements surrounding the 
layoff announcement dates have been restricted from the sample in order to capture par-
ticularly the effect of layoffs. In addition, the layoff announcements that consider only 
temporary layoffs are left out from the sample.  
 
5.1.1. Economic growth periods 
 
In order to study the effects of business cycle to the layoff announcements different 
economic growth periods need to be determined. A common way to determine recession 
is that the country is in a recession when the gross domestic product diminishes two 
subsequent quarters. According to this definition, there are two downturn periods in the 
research period (2007–2014). The first recession period starts from the fourth quarter of 
2008 and ends to fourth quarter of 2009. The second downturn takes place on the sec-
ond quarter of 2012 and ends to the first quarter of 2014. The upturn or non-
recessionary periods occur then from the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 
2008 and from the first quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2012 and in finally the 
three last quarters of 2014. By following this definition there are 111 layoff announce-
ments that are made during downturn period and 75 announcements made during non-
recessionary period. The figure 3 shows the changes in volume of GDP by quarter in 
Finland during the research period. 
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Figure 3. Changes in volume of gross domestic product by quarter in Finland 
 
5.1.2. Research limitations 
 
The use of Finnish data is causing limitations to the research. There are only a few ob-
servations in some of the ownership categories. This can be considered as limitation 
when measuring the impact of ownership structure to the stock price reaction to layoff 
announcement. Especially the foreign and institutional ownership categories have too 
little observations.  
 
 
5.2. Event study methodology  
 
The purpose of event studies in finance is to measure, how some particular event is in-
fluencing in the market value of a company. It’s supposed to be a useful method be-
cause the effects of an event are assumed to be reflected in prices immediately. 
(MacKinlay 1997.) Thus, the efficiency of the market reactions to new information can 
be tested with event studies. The event study methodology is assuming that the financial 
markets are functioning efficiently. In other words, the aim of an event study is to detect 
the abnormal returns caused by some specific events (Peterson 1989). It is an important 
methodological technique in market based empirical studies especially in accounting 
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and finance (Bowman 1983). The event study methodology is often used to detect, for 
example, the layoff announcements effects on stock prices (see e.g. Palmon et al. 1997).  
 
The background of the present event study methodology is in Fama, Fisher, Jensen and 
Roll’s (1969) and Ball and Brown’s (1968) studies. Ball and Brown (1968) study stock 
price reactions to annual earnings announcements. Fama et al. (1969) in turn, investi-
gate how stock splits effect on stock prices. These studies, using event study methodol-
ogy, set the base for a significant research area. (Bowman 1983).  
 
The event study methodology has been used for two main reasons: 1) to test whether the 
prices efficiently reflect the information available in the market and 2) in efficient mar-
ket conditions, to investigate the influence of some event on the stock prices. (Binder 
1998.) Previous studies examining the stock price reactions to corporate downsizing 
announcements have used the event study methodology. Particular method is also used 
in this study to detect impact of layoff announcements on companies share prices.  
 
5.2.1. Structure  
 
Many different kinds of techniques are used in event studies. However, the structure of 
an event study can be described in five steps. The steps are shown in the figure 3 below. 
The presented structure is concentrating on market efficiency tests. (Bowman 1983.) 
 
 
   
Figure 4. Basic structure of an event study. (Bowman 1983.) 
 
1. Specifying the event  
 
2. Modeling the stock price reaction 
 
3. Estimating the abnormal returns 
 
4. Grouping the abnormal returns 
 
5. Analyzing the findings 
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When conducting an event study, the first step is to define the event of interest. This is 
very important step because it determines the hypotheses that can be tested. Often in an 
event study the effects of a single event are studied, for example specific annual report. 
One can also investigate the impact of a type of event. (Bowman 1983.) For instance, 
layoff announcements made by different companies are an example of type of event.  
 
When studying a type of event more exogenous influences are affecting the results. This 
difference is due to many different time periods in the observations (Bowman 1983). 
More problems relating to event studies are discussed later in this section. 
 
In addition, choosing the right timing of event is very important part of identifying step. 
The event date should be the date when information first becomes available to the mar-
ket. Nevertheless, it is possible that the information has leaked to the market before the 
actual announcement. (Bowman 1983.) Also the information may be published through 
different sources in different times. For example, a company might release information 
today and the media may report this information tomorrow. Thus it isn’t always clear 
when the information reaches the public. (Peterson 1989.) In this thesis the chosen event 
date is date in which the layoff announcement is released.  
 
The time period over which the stock prices of the studied firms involved in this specif-
ic event is called an event window. Identifying this event window is also a key part of 
the first step. The event window is often chosen to be a few days surrounding the event 
date. (MacKinlay 1997.) Normal lengths of event windows are three, five or ten trading 
days (Benninga 2008: 372). The normal returns are estimated with estimation period 
before the event. Normal returns are expected returns if there is no event. (Peterson 
1989.) The length of the estimation window is usually 252 trading days (Benninga 2008: 
373). In this study the chosen estimation window is 200 trading days. The same length 
of the estimation window is used for example by Worrell et al. (1991). The event win-
dow is 11 days, five days prior and after the event date [-5, +5]. The time line of this 
event study is shown in figure 5. 
 
Event date 
 
 
-205   -5        0 +5 
 
 Estimation window Event window 
Figure 5. Time line of the event study. 
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The second step includes the modeling of the share price reaction. In practice it means 
the predicting of the direction and magnitude of the price reaction for different firms. 
One can also just hypothesize that the expected price reaction is the same for all the 
studied firms. Often in event studies the price reaction is expected to vary across firms 
and to be dependent on the information related to the studied event.  (Bowman 1983.)  
 
The third step in the event study procedure is to estimate the abnormal or excess returns. 
Abnormal return is the actual realized return following the event over the event window 
minus the normal return of the firm over the event window (MacKinlay 1997). There 
are several methods for estimating the abnormal returns. Commonly used methods are: 
unadjusted or mean adjusted returns, risk-adjusted returns and risk controlled portfolio 
returns. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is an example of risk-adjusted method. 
(Bowman 1983.) Next few models to calculate abnormal and normal returns are pre-
sented. The abnormal returns can be calculated using following equation: 
 
(7)  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡), 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) is the normal 
expected return for period 𝑡. 𝑋𝑡  sets the conditions for the model calculating normal 
returns. There are two commonly used alternatives for calculating normal returns: 1) the 
constant mean return model, where the condition 𝑋𝑡 is constant and 2) the market model, 
where the 𝑋𝑡 is the market return. The constant mean return model measures the normal 
returns by the averages of the returns. (MacKinlay 1997.)  
 
(8)  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡  , 
𝐸(𝛿𝑖𝑡) = 0  𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛿𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝛿𝑖
2  , 
  
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return for stock 𝑖 in the period 𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖𝑡 is the term for disturbance for 
security 𝑖 in period 𝑡, which has expected value of zero and variance 𝜎𝛿𝑖
2 . (MacKinlay 
1997.) 
 
The other common method for defining the normal returns is the market model shown 
in equation 9.  Market model is used to calculate the abnormal returns in this study. The 
market model connects the return of a security and the market portfolio return.  
 
(9)  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
  𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖𝑡
2  , 
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where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return for stock  𝑖 in the period 𝑡 and i 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market portfolio re-
turn in the period 𝑡. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 measures the zero mean disturbance term and 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜎𝜀𝑖𝑡
2  are 
the market model parameters. (MacKinlay 1997.) 𝛽  measures the systematic risk or 
market risk and 𝛼𝑖 measures the return of the security compared to the corresponding 
market risk. (Bodie et al. 2014: 359). The 𝛼𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖  can be estimated with ordinary 
least-square (OLS) regression over the estimation window (Benninga 2008: 373). In this 
study the market portfolio return is calculated from OMX Helsinki total return index. 
Calculating the abnormal returns with market model is shown in the equation 10. 
 
(10)  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 , 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for stock 𝑖 in the event date  𝑡 and  𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual 
return for stock 𝑖 in the event date 𝑡. For a single stock 𝑖 the average abnormal return 
𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ can be calculated with following equation: 
 
(11)  𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  , 
where 𝑁 is the number of observations and 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for stock 𝑖 in 
time 𝑡. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
Next the abnormal returns have to be grouped and organized for the analysis of the find-
ings. In this step the firms can be grouped into different portfolios, for example, based 
on the expected reaction. (Bowman 1983.) In addition, the abnormal returns are aggre-
gated over the event window. That is done by calculating the cumulative abnormal re-
turns. The cumulative abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is the sum of abnormal returns in the stud-
ied period (𝑡1, 𝑡2). It can be calculated with the equation 12. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
(12)  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
 
The cumulative average abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) can be measured by calculating 
the cumulative abnormal returns for each security and then aggregated over the time. 
(MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
(13)  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
(𝑡1, 𝑡2). 
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5.2.2 The significance tests for abnormal returns  
 
When the abnormal returns have been measured, the null hypothesis that the event has 
no impact to the stock prices must be tested. The simplest test statistic for average ab-
normal returns is as follows (Vaihekoski 2016):  
 
(14)  
√𝑁𝑥 𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
√𝜎2(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
~ 𝑡(𝑁) 
 
For the cumulative average abnormal returns the test is (Vaihekoski 2016):  
 
 
(15)  𝐽1 =  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝑡1,𝑡2)
√𝜎2(𝑡1,𝑡2 )
 ~ 𝑁(0,1) 
   
𝜎2(𝑡1, 𝑡2 ) =  
1
𝑁
 ∑(𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝜎2(𝑡1, 𝑡2 ) 
= (𝑡2 − 𝑡1 + 1)𝜎
2(𝑡1, 𝑡2) 
 
When examining the significance of the results the significance level must be deter-
mined. The significance level tells how big the risk is that the found difference or de-
pendence is caused by coincident. Commonly used significance levels are 0,05 (5%), 
0,01 (1%) and 0,001 (0,1%). (Heikkilä 2014: 184.)   
 
5.2.3. Problems associated with event studies 
 
First of all, the timing of an event studied should be correct. If the timing goes wrong, 
it’s very difficult to detect abnormal stock price movement. (Bowman 1983.) Studies 
where identifying the exact evet date has been difficult have been less meaningful. For 
instance, it is difficult to study the effects of regulatory changes to the stock prices with 
event study methodology because the regulatory changes are publicly discussed for a 
long time and the effects will slowly incorporate into the share price. (MacKinlay 1997) 
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Other major problem with event studies are the confounding events. For example, is a 
firm makes a dividend announcement right after the earnings announcement, the earn-
ings announcement will be a confounding event when studying the effects of dividend 
announcement. Confounding events can significantly affect to the results in event stud-
ies. Especially firm specific announcements are problematic. Therefore, confounding 
events should be controlled when performing an event study in order to get successful 
results. (Bowman 1983.) The confounding events such as earnings announcements are 
taken into consideration in this study. In addition, Brown and Warner (1985) present 
other possible problems related to event studies such as: 
1. Non-normality of returns and abnormal returns 
2. Biased OLS estimates of the market model parameters due to non-synchronous 
trading 
3. Estimation of the variance used in hypothesis testing and the issues of autocorre-
lation in daily abnormal returns.   
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6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the empirical findings of the study. First the results 
for the whole sample are presented. The results for the six ownership subsamples are 
also discussed in their own paragraphs. The sample is divided into two separate catego-
ries based on the layoff reason. Moreover, to take into consideration the business cycle 
the sample layoff announcements are also categorized in to two subsamples those that 
are made during recession and to those that are made in non-recessionary periods. In 
addition, the abnormal returns are tested with OLS regression method at the end of this 
section. 
 
 
6.1. Results for the whole sample 
 
According to the results, the stock market reaction to layoff announcements is negative. 
As can be seen from the table 2 the abnormal return on the event day is -0,58% for the 
sample firms on average. The t-value is -2,43 which indicates statistical significance at 
five percent level. The average abnormal returns turn to positive one day after the layoff 
announcement but then decrease again in the second post event day. As the figure 6 
shows the abnormal returns are varying from positive to negative over the event period. 
However, the average abnormal returns for the whole sample are only statistically sig-
nificant at the announcement date and the second day after that.  
 
The cumulative average abnormal returns are negative for the whole event window. The 
CAARs are statistically significant in time interval [0, +1] surrounding the layoff an-
nouncement date. The cumulative average abnormal returns are negative and significant 
at the event date and at second and fourth day after the announcement. For time interval 
from -5 to -1 the CAARs are negative but insignificant. There are no significant average 
abnormal or cumulative average abnormal returns before the layoff announcement 
which indicates that there are no signs of information leakage.  
 
As the figure 6 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns continue to drift down-
wards after the layoff announcement and statistically significant negative CAARs occur. 
Thus, one can interpret that the market is not efficient. If it was efficient, the impact of 
layoffs would have incorporated to the price immediately after the announcement. 
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Figure 6. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the whole 
sample. 
 
All in all, based on these findings the first hypothesis that layoff announcements cause 
negative stock market reaction in Finland can be accepted. The reaction is negative and 
statistically significant for the whole sample. These results are in line with earlier stud-
ies that have found negative abnormal returns for he firms that announce layoffs. 
 
 
Table 2. Average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the whole 
sample. N=186. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level re-
spectively. 
t AAR t-Stat for AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat for CAAR p-value 
-5 0,05 % 0,23 0,82 0,05 % 0,25 0,80 
-4 -0,11 % -0,72 0,47 -0,06 % -0,24 0,81 
-3 -0,23 % -1,39 0,16 -0,29 % -0,94 0,35 
-2 0,08 % 0,51 0,61 -0,22 % -0,60 0,55 
-1 0,07 % 0,44 0,66 -0,15 % -0,37 0,71 
0 -0,58 %** -2,43 0,02 -0,72 %* -1,66 0,10 
1 0,14 % 0,97 0,33 -0,59 % -1,24 0,21 
2 -0,37 %** -2,14 0,03 -0,95 %* -1,88 0,06 
3 0,12 % 0,79 0,43 -0,84 % -1,56 0,12 
4 -0,09 % -0,74 0,46 -0,93 %* -1,64 0,10 
5 -0,02 % -0,14 0,89 -0,95 % -1,60 0,11 
 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -0,15 % -0,37 % -0,44 %* -0,23 % 
J1 -0,37 -1,20 -1,73 -0,57 
p-value 0,71 0,23 0,08 0,57 
-1,20%
-1,00%
-0,80%
-0,60%
-0,40%
-0,20%
0,00%
0,20%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
All firms
AAR CAAR
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6.2. Concentrated and widely held companies 
 
For the concentrated ownership category, the stock market reaction to layoff announce-
ments is also negative. The abnormal return on the event date is -0,77 % and it’s statis-
tically significant at five percent level. Compared to the whole sample the reaction at 
the event date is a little more negative for the concentrated ownership firms. However, 
at the third day after the announcement positive and statistically significant abnormal 
return of 0,50 % occur.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns for the concentrated 
ownership subsample. 
 
 
The cumulative average abnormal returns are negative for almost the whole event win-
dow but they are statistically insignificant. CAARs are also negative for the interval [0, 
+1]. The figure 7 and table 3 present the results in more detail. These findings show that 
the firms that have concentrated ownership structure experience a negative stock market 
reaction to layoff announcements.  
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Table 3. Results for the concentrated ownership subsample. N= *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR t-Stat for AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat for CAAR p-value 
-5 0,07 % 0,24 0,81 0,07 % 0,26 0,79 
-4 -0,08 % -0,39 0,70 -0,01 % -0,02 0,98 
-3 -0,21 % -0,90 0,37 -0,22 % -0,49 0,63 
-2 0,07 % 0,34 0,74 -0,15 % -0,28 0,78 
-1 0,06 % 0,24 0,81 -0,09 % -0,15 0,88 
0 -0,77 %** -2,10 0,04 -0,86 % -1,34 0,18 
1 0,12 % 0,63 0,53 -0,74 % -1,07 0,29 
2 -0,40 % -1,45 0,15 -1,13 % -1,53 0,13 
3 0,50 %** 2,33 0,02 -0,63 % -0,81 0,42 
4 -0,04 % -0,23 0,82 -0,67 % -0,81 0,42 
5 -0,23 % -0,94 0,35 -0,90 % -1,04 0,30 
 
 
For the widely held firms the event day average abnormal return is -0.33% but it’s not 
statistically significant. Statistically significant negative average abnormal returns occur 
second and third day after the event. Thus, this might indicate that the market reacts 
slowly to the layoff announcements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Average and cumulative average abnormal returns for the diffused ownership struc-
ture firms. 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -0,09 % -0,59 % -0,65 %* -0,04 % 
J1 -0,15 -1,31 -1,76 -0,06 
p-value 0,88 0,19 0,08 0,95 
-1,50%
-1,00%
-0,50%
0,00%
0,50%
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Diffused ownership firms 
AAR CAAR
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As the figure 8 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns are negative but they 
only statistically significant at fourth day after the announcement. For all different time 
intervals, the CAARs are negative but statistically insignificant. Bennet (2010) shows 
that large outside shareholders may be good monitors for firm’s management. He finds 
positive market reactions to asset sale announcements for firms that have large outside 
shareholders. However, this doesn’t seem to be the case in here. Compared to the con-
centrated ownership subsample the reaction to layoff announcements for diffused own-
ership firms is less negative and less significant. The results for widely held firms are 
presented in table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Results for the diffused ownership firms. N= *, ** and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR t-Stat for AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat for CAAR p-value 
-5 0,02 % 0,06 0,95 0,02 % 0,07 0,94 
-4 -0,14 % -0,63 0,53 -0,12 % -0,37 0,71 
-3 -0,25 % -1,10 0,27 -0,38 % -0,93 0,35 
-2 0,08 % 0,42 0,68 -0,30 % -0,64 0,52 
-1 0,08 % 0,45 0,65 -0,23 % -0,43 0,67 
0 -0,33 % -1,22 0,22 -0,56 % -0,97 0,33 
1 0,16 % 0,75 0,45 -0,40 % -0,65 0,52 
2 -0,33 %* -1,80 0,07 -0,73 % -1,10 0,27 
3 -0,36 %** -1,93 0,05 -1,09 % -1,54 0,12 
4 -0,16 % -0,86 0,39 -1,25 %* -1,68 0,09 
5 0,23 % 1,11 0,27 -1,02 % -1,31 0,19 
 
 
6.3. Results for the state ownership firms 
 
Interestingly for the state ownership companies the cumulative average abnormal re-
turns are positive starting from one day before the actual event date until the end of the 
event window. However, they are statistically insignificant. As can be seen from the 
figure 9 the curve for CAARs is sloping upwards. CAARs are statistically significant at 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR  -0,23 % -0,10 % -0,18 % -0,46 % 
J1 -0,43 -0,24 -0,53 -0,87 
p-value 0,67 0,81 0,60 0,38 
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10 percent level in the time interval from +1 to +5 days after the announcement 
(1,38 %). CAARs are also positive but insignificant for other time intervals. For all of 
the other ownership categories the cumulative abnormal returns are mostly negative. 
The average abnormal return on the layoff announcement day is -0,19 % but it’s not 
statistically significant. The reaction is also a little slow for state ownership firms. Sta-
tistically significant positive abnormal return (1,06 %) occur only in the third day post 
the event. The results are presented in detail in table 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average and cumulative average abnormal returns for state ownership subsample. 
 
 
The results differ a lot from other ownership structure groups. There are no significant 
positive abnormal returns after the layoff announcements in other ownership subsam-
ples. These findings may indicate that state owned firms are possibly inefficient and the 
market sees that layoffs are therefore a good way to improve the efficiency. The small 
magnitude of the reaction may also be explained with the fact that state as the owner 
might not react to the layoff announcements and won’t sell the shares. Moreover, the 
inefficiency of the market can be seen here too. The cumulative average abnormal re-
turns drift upwards and of the CAAR intervals the [+1, +5] is only significant one.  
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Table 5. Average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns for the state ownership 
firms. N=28. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respec-
tively. 
t AAR  t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 -0,57 % -1,61 0,11 -0,57 %* -1,63 0,10 
-4 -0,01 % -0,05 0,96 -0,58 % -1,17 0,24 
-3 0,12 % 0,46 0,64 -0,46 % -0,76 0,45 
-2 0,21 % 0,67 0,50 -0,25 % -0,36 0,72 
-1 0,45 % 1,11 0,27 0,20 % 0,26 0,80 
0 -0,19 % -0,39 0,70 0,02 % 0,02 0,98 
1 0,37 % 0,81 0,42 0,39 % 0,42 0,68 
2 -0,29 % -0,69 0,49 0,10 % 0,10 0,92 
3 1,06 %** 2,27 0,02 1,16 % 1,10 0,27 
4 -0,25 % -0,95 0,34 0,92 % 0,92 0,36 
5 0,48 % 1,57 0,12 1,39 % 1,20 0,23 
 
 
6.4. Foreign ownership subsample 
 
 
Figure 10. Average and cumulative average abnormal returns for the foreign ownership catego-
ry. 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR  0,20 % 0,64 % 0,19 % 1,38 %* 
J1 0,26 1,05 0,38 1,75 
p-value 0,80 0,29 0,71 0,08 
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Compared to the state ownership firms for the foreign ownership firms the cumulative 
average abnormal returns are a lot more negative in the event window. As can be seen 
from the figure 10 the cumulative average abnormal returns for foreign owned firms are 
sloping downwards and in contrast for state owned firms they are upward sloping. 
 
The announcement date average abnormal returns for foreign ownership firms is -
0,45 %. However, it’s not statistically significant. Negative and significant average ab-
normal returns occur two days before (-0,74 %) and two days after the announcement (-
0,62 %). This indicates that the stock market reaction to the layoff announcement is not 
accurate. There might be information leakage before the actual announcement. On the 
other hand, the reaction might be also slow because of the significant abnormal return 
and cumulative abnormal returns on second day after the announcement. The cumula-
tive average abnormal returns are statistically significant at 10 percent level at second, 
third and fourth day after the layoff announcement. They are the most negative of all 
ownership subsamples. The cumulative average abnormal return is at its most negative 
on the third day after the announcement (-2,85%). For the different time intervals, the 
CAARs are negative but insignificant.  
 
 
Table 6. Results for the foreign ownership firms. N=20. *, ** and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
t AAR t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 0,63 % 0,80 0,42 0,63 % 1,37 0,17 
-4 -0,73 % -1,33 0,18 -0,10 % -0,15 0,88 
-3 0,01 % 0,02 0,99 -0,09 % -0,11 0,91 
-2 -0,74 %* -1,72 0,09 -0,82 % -0,88 0,38 
-1 -0,30 % -1,06 0,29 -1,12 % -1,08 0,28 
0 -0,45 % -0,84 0,40 -1,57 % -1,38 0,17 
1 -0,12 % -0,27 0,78 -1,69 % -1,38 0,17 
2 -0,62 %** -2,06 0,04 -2,31 %* -1,76 0,08 
3 -0,27 % -0,90 0,37 -2,58 %* -1,85 0,06 
4 0,13 % 0,34 0,73 -2,45 %* -1,67 0,10 
5 0,33 % 1,01 0,31 -2,12 % -1,37 0,17 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -1,12 % -0,87 % -0,57 % -0,55 % 
J1 -1,08 -1,08 -0,87 -0,53 
p-value 0,28 0,28 0,39 0,60 
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6.5. Results for family/person subsample 
 
The most negative average abnormal returns of the all ownership subsamples occur for 
the firms that have family or person as the largest owner. The announcement day aver-
age abnormal return is -1,13% which is statistically significant at five percent level. In 
addition, the cumulative average abnormal returns are negative for almost the whole 
event window. For example, at the fifth day after the event the cumulative average ab-
normal return is almost two percent (-1,82%). The cumulative average abnormal returns 
for different time intervals in the event window are statistically significant for [0, +1] 
period. The results for family/person ownership subsample are presented in detail in 
figure 11 and table 7. 
 
 
Figure 11. Average and cumulative average abnormal returns for family/person ownership sub-
sample. 
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Table 7. Average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns for the family/person 
ownership firms. N=73. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
t AAR t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 0,23 % 0,66 0,51 0,23 % 0,69 0,49 
-4 -0,25 % -1,17 0,24 -0,02 % -0,05 0,96 
-3 -0,58 %* -1,85 0,06 -0,61 % -1,06 0,29 
-2 -0,13 % -0,58 0,56 -0,74 % -1,12 0,26 
-1 0,43 %* 1,78 0,07 -0,32 % -0,43 0,67 
0 -1,13 %** -2,35 0,02 -1,45 %* -1,78 0,08 
1 0,17 % 0,91 0,36 -1,28 % -1,45 0,15 
2 -0,48 %* -1,63 0,10 -1,76 %* -1,87 0,06 
3 0,12 % 0,47 0,64 -1,64 %* -1,64 0,10 
4 0,06 % 0,26 0,80 -1,59 % -1,50 0,13 
5 -0,23 % -0,90 0,37 -1,82 %* -1,65 0,10 
 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -0,32 % -0,53 % -0,96 %** -0,37 % 
J1 -0,43 -0,92 -2,04 -0,50 
p-value 0,670 0,356 0,042 0,620 
 
 
6.6. Results for institutional ownership subsample 
 
For the institutional ownership category, the market reaction to layoff announcements is 
also significantly negative. The announcement day average abnormal return is -1,12 %. 
In addition, negative and statistically significant average abnormal return occurs two 
days after the announcement (-0,81%). Nevertheless, AAR is positive and significant 
two days prior the announcement (1,12%). The cumulative average abnormal returns 
are mostly positive for the different days in the event window. However, they are only 
statistically significant at five days before the announcement.  
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Figure 12. Average and cumulative average abnormal returns for the institutional ownership 
subsample.  
 
 
The quite large negative average abnormal return on the layoff announcement day may 
indicate that institutional owners vote with their legs. Thus, they might sell the shares if 
they see that the future expectations of the firm’s investment opportunities are decreas-
ing.  
 
 
Table 8. Average abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns for the institutional own-
ership firms. N=19. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
t AAR  t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 1,04 % 1,40 0,16 1,04 %* 1,84 0,07 
-4 -0,65 % -1,41 0,16 0,39 % 0,48 0,63 
-3 -0,03 % -0,06 0,95 0,35 % 0,36 0,72 
-2 1,12 %** 2,10 0,04 1,47 % 1,30 0,19 
-1 0,28 % 0,78 0,44 1,75 % 1,38 0,17 
0 -1,12 %* -1,86 0,06 0,64 % 0,46 0,65 
1 0,60 % 1,16 0,24 1,23 % 0,82 0,41 
2 -0,81 %** -2,11 0,03 0,42 % 0,26 0,79 
3 -0,29 % -0,81 0,42 0,13 % 0,08 0,94 
4 -0,58 % -1,48 0,14 -0,45 % -0,25 0,80 
5 0,56 % 1,15 0,25 0,11 % 0,06 0,95 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR 1,75 % -0,24 % -0,52 % -0,53 % 
J1 1,38 -0,24 -0,65 -0,42 
p-value 0,17 0,81 0,52 0,68 
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All in all, the average abnormal returns on the layoff announcement day are negative for 
all of the different ownership structure samples. These findings are supporting the first 
hypothesis and findings of the previous studies such as Worrell et al. (1991). In addition, 
there are small differences in the abnormal returns when comparing the different owner-
ship subsamples. The most negative reaction occurs for the family or person ownership 
firms and the most positive or least negative reaction occurs for the state ownership 
firms. However, the small sample size might be an issue and affect to the results, espe-
cially for the foreign and institutional ownership subsamples. The differences between 
the ownership subsamples are tested with OLS regression at the end of this section. 
 
 
6.7. Layoff reason 
 
The previous literature has focused a lot on the dependence of the stock market reaction 
on announced reason of the layoff. (see e.g. Worrell et al. 1991, Palmon et al. 1997). 
For example, Kashefi and McKee (2001) find that proactive layoff announcements that 
are part of the firm’s strategy cause positive abnormal returns and on the contrary reac-
tive layoff announcements that are reaction to financial distress cause negative abnor-
mal returns.  
 
The 186 sample layoff announcements are divided here in two different subsamples in 
order to test if the announced layoff reason causes different abnormal returns. The two 
subsamples are proactive such as efficiency enhancing or restructuring and reactive 
layoff announcements which are reactions to decreased demand or adverse market con-
ditions. There are 94 layoff announcements that are classified into reactive and 88 an-
nouncements that belong to the proactive category. Four of the sample layoff an-
nouncements can’t be classified in to either of the groups due to lack of specific layoff 
reason. 
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Figure 13. Average and average cumulative abnormal returns for reactive layoff announce-
ments. 
 
In line with previous studies the reactive layoff announcements cause negative abnor-
mal returns on the event day. The announcement day average abnormal return is -1,05% 
and it’s statistically significant on one percent level. The cumulative average abnormal 
return on the event day is -1,31% and it’s statistically significant on five percent level. 
The cumulative average abnormal returns are negative for the whole event window. In 
addition, they are also negative and significant on time interval [0, +1]. 
 
 
Table 9. Results for reactive layoff announcement groups. N=94. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 0,00 % 0,00 1,00 0,00 % 0,00 1,00 
-4 -0,15 % -0,68 0,49 -0,15 % -0,39 0,69 
-3 -0,34 % -1,37 0,17 -0,49 % -1,03 0,30 
-2 0,14 % 0,67 0,50 -0,35 % -0,64 0,52 
-1 0,09 % 0,38 0,71 -0,26 % -0,42 0,67 
0 -1,05 %*** -2,51 0,01 -1,31 %** -1,94 0,05 
1 0,24 % 1,11 0,27 -1,07 % -1,46 0,14 
2 -0,39 % -1,42 0,15 -1,46 %* -1,87 0,06 
3 0,12 % 0,55 0,58 -1,34 % -1,61 0,11 
4 -0,05 % -0,33 0,74 -1,39 % -1,59 0,11 
5 -0,11 % -0,41 0,68 -1,50 %* -1,63 0,10 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -0,26 % -0,72 % -0,81 %** -0,19 % 
J1 -0,42 -1,50 -2,07 -0,30 
p-value 0,67 0,13 0,04 0,76 
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The average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns for the firms 
that state efficiency enhancing or restructuring as a reason for the layoffs are not statis-
tically significant in any of the days in the event window. These findings are similar to 
the findings of earlier research which has stated that reactive layoff announcements 
cause more negative returns (see e.g. Lee 1997, Hillier et al. 2007). Perhaps the reactive 
layoffs are a sign of bad financial condition of the firm and the market sees that the fu-
ture growth and cash flow expectations of the firm are lowered. The results for the pro-
active subsample are presented in the table 10. 
 
 
Table 10. Results for the proactive layoff announcement subsample. N=88. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR  t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 -0,02 % -0,10 0,92 -0,02 % -0,10 0,92 
-4 -0,06 % -0,33 0,74 -0,09 % -0,27 0,79 
-3 -0,17 % -0,77 0,44 -0,26 % -0,65 0,51 
-2 0,11 % 0,57 0,57 -0,15 % -0,32 0,75 
-1 0,04 % 0,24 0,81 -0,10 % -0,20 0,84 
0 -0,14 % -0,65 0,52 -0,24 % -0,42 0,67 
1 0,07 % 0,36 0,72 -0,17 % -0,28 0,78 
2 -0,28 % -1,36 0,17 -0,45 % -0,69 0,49 
3 0,08 % 0,39 0,69 -0,37 % -0,54 0,59 
4 -0,20 % -1,01 0,31 -0,57 % -0,79 0,43 
5 0,04 % 0,21 0,84 -0,54 % -0,70 0,48 
 
 
6.8. Growth periods 
 
Earlier studies suggest that layoff announcements made during recession cause more 
negative stock market reaction than those made during non-recessionary periods 
(Elayan et al. 1998, Marshall 2012). This hypothesis is tested here by dividing the sam-
ple layoff announcements into two groups based on whether they are made during re-
cession or not. 
 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR -0,10 % -0,02 % -0,07 % -0,30 % 
J1 -0,20 -0,06 -0,21 -0,58 
p-value 0,84 0,95 0,83 0,56 
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According to the common view that recession starts when GDP decreases in two subse-
quent quarters in a row there are two recession periods in Finnish economy during the 
years 2007–2014. This sample includes 111 layoff announcements made during reces-
sion and 75 layoff announcements during upturn periods.  
 
Results show that the event day abnormal return for recession subsample is -0,67% and 
it’s statistically significant at one percent level. The cumulative average abnormal re-
turns are also negative but not statistically significant over the evet window. In contrast, 
the abnormal returns for non-recessionary period are not statistically significant. How-
ever, the cumulative abnormal returns for non-recessionary period are more negative 
than during recession. At days from +2 to +5 the cumulative abnormal returns are nega-
tive and statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 11. Results for recession period. N=111. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR  t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR  t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 -0,06 % -0,23 0,81 -0,06 % -0,25 0,81 
-4 0,01 % 0,07 0,94 -0,05 % -0,13 0,89 
-3 -0,39 %* -1,71 0,09 -0,43 % -1,03 0,30 
-2 0,09 % 0,50 0,62 -0,34 % -0,70 0,48 
-1 0,07 % 0,37 0,71 -0,27 % -0,50 0,61 
0 -0,67 %*** -2,48 0,01 -0,94 % -1,59 0,11 
1 0,25 % 1,35 0,18 -0,69 % -1,08 0,28 
2 -0,27 % -1,40 0,16 -0,96 % -1,41 0,16 
3 0,25 % 1,24 0,22 -0,72 % -0,98 0,33 
4 -0,01 % -0,07 0,94 -0,73 % -0,95 0,34 
5 -0,03 % -0,14 0,89 -0,75 % -0,94 0,35 
 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR  -0,27 % -0,35 % -0,02 % 0,19 % 
J1 -0,50 -0,84 -0,06 0,35 
p-value 0,61 0,40 0,95 0,72 
 
 
The reason why the results don’t really support the hypothesis that layoff announce-
ments made during recession cause more negative abnormal returns than layoff an-
nouncements made during upturn period might depend on the economic situation in 
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Finland in the research period 2007–2014. Since the recession started in 2008 the eco-
nomic growth has been very low. Thus, the difference between recession and non-
recessionary periods has not been very large in the Finnish economy. 
 
 
Table 12. Results for the non-recession period. N=75. *, ** and *** denote statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
t AAR  t-Stat of AAR p-value CAAR U t-Stat of CAAR p-value 
-5 0,20 % 0,62 0,54 0,20 % 1,15 0,25 
-4 -0,28 % -1,38 0,17 -0,08 % -0,33 0,74 
-3 0,00 % 0,01 0,99 -0,08 % -0,26 0,79 
-2 0,05 % 0,20 0,84 -0,03 % -0,09 0,93 
-1 0,07 % 0,25 0,80 0,04 % 0,09 0,93 
0 -0,43 % -1,01 0,31 -0,40 % -0,93 0,35 
1 -0,03 % -0,14 0,89 -0,43 % -0,93 0,35 
2 -0,50 % -1,62 0,11 -0,93 %* -1,88 0,06 
3 -0,08 % -0,37 0,71 -1,01 %** -1,93 0,05 
4 -0,21 % -1,27 0,21 -1,22 %** -2,21 0,03 
5 -0,02 % -0,06 0,95 -1,24 %** -2,24 0,02 
 
 
6.9. OLS Regression results 
 
Next Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is constructed in order to find if there are 
significant differences in the layoff announcement reactions between different owner-
ship groups, recession and non-recession periods and between the layoff reasons. In 
addition, the regression also controls for the layoff size. The layoff size is measured by 
the layoff ratio which is the amount of employees that are announced to be under the co-
determination negotiations divided by the total number of employees in the company. 
The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the interval [-1, +5] 
in the event window. The [-1, +5] CAR interval is chosen as the dependent variable 
because it covers the abnormal returns at the event day, one day before and five days the 
layoff announcement. There are statistically significant abnormal returns few days after 
[𝐭𝟏, 𝐭𝟐] [-5, -1] [-1, +1] [0, +1] [+1, +5] 
CAAR 0,04 % -0,40 % -0,47 %* -0,84 %** 
J1 0,09 -1,31 -1,88 -2,15 
p-value 0,93 0,19 0,06 0,03 
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the layoff announcements for many of the subsamples. Table 13 presents the descriptive 
statistics for CAR [-1, +5] and for the layoff ratio and its components.  
 
Similar regression method is used, for example, by Hillier et al. (2007). Hillier et al. 
(2007) have different dummy variables for different layoff reasons in their regression 
model. They also have control variable for layoff size among other variables. Moreover, 
Lee (1997) estimates a multivariate regression model for cumulative abnormal returns. 
The regression includes dummy variables for layoff reason and whether there are multi-
ple layoff announcements for one firm or not. The layoff size is also included into Lee’s 
(1997) regression. 
  
 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for CAR [-1, +5] and for the layoff ratio and its compo-
nents.  
  Mean Median Standard deviation 
CAR [-1, +5] -0,007 -0,004 0,051 
Number of employees under negotiations 476 246 687 
Total number of employees 11635 4511 22233 
Layoff ratio 0,189 0,066 0,268 
 
 
The regression model includes different dummy variables for different ownership 
groups and for layoff reason and recession. The ownership group dummies take value of 
one if they are included in some specific group. There is also a dummy for concentrated 
ownership that takes value of one if the firm is included in the concentrated ownership 
group and zero if the firm is widely held. The layoff reason has own dummy too. The 
reactive dummy takes value of one if the layoff reason is reactive e.g. declining demand 
and zero if the layoff reason is proactive. In addition, the recession dummy is included 
in order to find if the recession is affecting the CARs. It takes value of one if the layoff 
announcement is made during recessionary period and zero otherwise. These dummies 
are added in order to find if there are significant differences between the ownership 
structures or is the reason of the layoff affecting significantly to the abnormal returns or 
if the recession has an effect. The regression equation is shown below. 
 
(16) CAR [-1, +5] = 𝛼0  + 𝛽1CONSENTRATED +𝛽2FAMILY_PERSON + 𝛽3FOR-
EIGN + 𝛽4 INSTITUTIONAL + 𝛽5 STATE + 𝛽6 REACTIVE + 𝛽7 RECESSION + 
𝛽8LRATIO 
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The regression results are presented in detail in table 14. The results show that the only 
statistically significant coefficient is state ownership dummy. The coefficient is positive 
and significant at one percent level. Consequently, the stock market seems to react posi-
tively to the state layoff announcements. This finding indicates that there are differences 
in the stock market reactions between the ownership structure groups. Consequently, the 
second hypothesis is accepted.  
 
 
Table 14. OLS regression results for cumulative abnormal returns. The dependent variable in 
the regression is CAR [-1, +5].  N=186. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat p-value 
Intercept -0,008 0,010 -0,840 0,402 
CONCENTRATED -0,007 0,008 -0,961 0,338 
FAMILY_PERSON 0,008 0,010 0,767 0,444 
FOREIGN 0,000 0,008 -0,034 0,973 
INSTITUTIONAL -0,001 0,014 -0,053 0,958 
STATE 0,033*** 0,013 2,546 0,012 
REACTIVE -0,011 0,008 -1,437 0,152 
RECESSION 0,009 0,008 1,113 0,267 
LRATIO -0,015 0,015 -0,961 0,338 
R-squared 0,066    
 
 
The dummy variables for other ownership categories are statistically insignificant. Also 
the concentration dummy is insignificant. Moreover, coefficients for the institutional 
and reactive dummies and for the intercept are negative but insignificant. In addition, 
the recession dummy is positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, the third hypothesis 
that layoff announcements that are made during recession cause more negative stock 
market reaction than those made during non-recessionary period can’t be accepted. 
Moreover, the layoff reason dummy is negative but statistically insignificant. The hy-
pothesis five stated that reactive layoff announcements cause more negative stock mar-
ket reaction than those that are proactive. Thus, the fifth hypothesis cannot be accepted 
based on the regression results. The layoff ratio coefficient is negative but insignificant. 
Therefore, the fourth hypothesis suggesting that layoffs that affect larger percentage of 
the firm’s workforce cause more negative stock market reaction can’t either be accepted. 
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Furthermore, an additional regression model is constructed to examine the joint impact 
of layoff reason and different ownership groups. The additional regression includes 
therefore an interaction term which is the reactive dummy. The interaction term is added 
to see how, for instance, state ownership firms that have reactive layoff reason impact to 
the stock market reaction. The regression is described in equation 17. For example, 
Filbeck and Webb (2001) construct an interaction term regression model to study the 
joint impact of firm size and insider ownership.  
 
(17) CAR[-1, +5] =  𝛼0  + 𝛽1CONSENTRATED +𝛽2FAMILY_PERSON + 𝛽3FOR-
EIGN + 𝛽4 INSTITUTIONAL + 𝛽5 STATE + 𝛽6 REACTIVE + 𝛽7 RECESSION + 
𝛽8 LRATIO + 𝛽9 CONSENTRADED*REACTIVE + 𝛽10 FAMI-
LY_PERSON*REACTIVE + 𝛽11 FOREIGN*REACTIVE + 𝛽12 INSTITUTION-
AL*REACTIVE + 𝛽13STATE*REACTIVE + 𝛽14RECESSION*REACTIVE  
 
The results from regression with interaction term show that the concentrated*reactive 
dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at five percent level. Thus, con-
centrated ownership with reactive layoff reason together affect negatively to the stock 
price reaction. In addition, now the recession dummy becomes positive and statistically 
significant indicating that layoff announcements made during recession have more posi-
tive impact than layoff announcements made during upturn. Consequently, the hypothe-
sis three is rejected. Moreover, the intercept is negative and statistically significant at 
five percent level. Other variables are statistically insignificant. The results are shown in 
detail in table 15. 
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Table 15. Interaction term OLS regression results. The dependent variable in the regression is 
CAR [-1, +5].  N=186. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat p-value 
Intercept -0,024** 0,012 -2,008 0,046 
CONCENTRATED 0,013 0,011 1,190 0,236 
FAMILY_PERSON 0,012 0,013 0,914 0,362 
FOREIGN -0,010 0,018 -0,537 0,592 
INSTITUTIONAL -0,003 0,018 -0,156 0,877 
STATE 0,013 0,018 0,705 0,482 
REACTIVE 0,016 0,019 0,849 0,397 
RECESSION 0,020* 0,011 1,900 0,059 
LRATIO -0,009 0,015 -0,562 0,575 
CONCENTRATED*REACTIVE -0,041** 0,017 -2,438 0,016 
FAMILY_PERSON*REACTIVE -0,003 0,020 -0,148 0,883 
FOREIGN*REACTIVE 0,015 0,028 0,533 0,595 
INSTITUTIONAL*REACIVE 0,003 0,029 0,107 0,915 
STATE*REACTIVE 0,040 0,026 1,533 0,127 
RECESISSION*REACTIVE -0,020 0,015 -1,319 0,189 
R-squared 0,121    
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out if the layoff announcements cause abnormal 
returns in the Finnish stock market and whether the stock market reactions diverge be-
tween different ownership structure firms. The sample includes 186 layoff announce-
ments in the research period 2007–2014. The layoff announcements are divided into 
different ownership subsamples based on who is the largest owner in the firm. There are 
six different ownership groups in this study: state, family/person, foreign, institutional 
and concentrated or diffusely owned firms. In addition, the sample is divided based on 
the layoff reason and also whether the layoffs are announced during recession or not.   
 
Many previous studies have shown that stock market reacts negatively to the corporate 
layoff announcements. However, some researchers have also found positive abnormal 
returns associated with some layoff announcements. In addition, the prior findings show 
that layoff announcements made during recessions cause more negative stock market 
reaction than those that are made during upturns. Moreover, the size of the layoff has 
been proven to have an effect on the reaction. More negative reaction is associated with 
layoffs that consider larger percentage of employees than with those that affect only a 
small fraction of workers. Additionally, the prior research has often studied the effects 
of the layoff reason on the stock market reaction. More negative reactions have been 
detected with layoff announcements that state reactivity (e.g. declined demand) as the 
layoff reason than with proactive (e.g. restructuring) layoff announcements.  
 
Prior research has also shown that ownership structure has an effect on stock valuation 
and firm performance. For example, the findings show that for example, family firms 
perform better than non-family firms. On the other hand, family, state and corporate 
ownership have been shown to have negative influence on firms’ market-to-book values. 
The impact of ownership structure has been also studied for example in context of cor-
porate asset sales. The evidence shows that stock market reaction to asset sales is more 
positive for firms that have large outside shareholders than for widely held firms which 
indicates that large outside owners act as a good monitor for the firms.  
 
Based on previous literature five hypotheses are formed. The first hypothesis states that 
layoff announcements in Finland cause negative stock market reaction. The second hy-
pothesis is that the stock market reactions to layoff announcements diverge between 
different ownership structure firms. The third hypothesis takes into consideration the 
impact of recession: layoff announcements made during recession affect more negative-
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ly to the stock price reaction than those made during upturn period. Moreover, the 
fourth hypothesis states that layoff announcements that affect larger percentage of a 
firm’s employees cause more negative stock market reaction. And finally the fifth hy-
pothesis is that reactive layoff announcements cause more negative stock market reac-
tion than proactive ones.  
 
The theoretical framework in this study includes efficient market theory and stock valu-
ation. The purpose of the stock valuation part is to show which different factors impact 
on the stock price and how they affect. For example, the Gordon’s growth model shows 
how required rate of return, dividend expectations and growth rate of dividends affect to 
the stock price. Based on the model can be interpreted that the growth of required rate 
of return impacts negatively to the stock price and the growth of dividends in turn has a 
positive effect on the price. When a firm reduces its workforce the required rate of re-
turn might decrease because by laying off the firm in a way reduces its debt when the 
salary costs decrease. The dividend expectations in turn might grow because more mon-
ey is left to the distribution of dividends. Thus, in theory the stock price should increase 
due to layoffs.  
 
The informative efficiency of the market can affect to the stock price reaction to layoff 
announcements. According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices should in-
clude all available information in the market. In other words, the market is then infor-
mationally efficient. Thus, the impact of layoff announcements should immediately be 
reflected in the prices. Fama (1970) divides the market into three different forms based 
on what kind of information prices include. The most relevant efficiency form for this 
study is the semi-strong market efficiency because layoff announcements are both new 
and publicly available information. 
 
The layoff announcements’ reactions to stock prices are tested in this study with event 
study methodology which is presented in chapter five. The event study methodology 
detects the abnormal returns caused by layoff announcements. In order to measure the 
abnormal returns first normal returns are calculated with the market model and then 
they are decreased from the actual returns. The abnormal returns are calculated for 11 
days’ period surrounding the announcement, five days before and five days after. In 
addition, cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for the event window and different 
time intervals in the event window. To examine the statistical significance of abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns they are then tested with a t-test.    
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The empirical findings show that overall the stock market reaction to layoff announce-
ments is negative and statistically significant. For all of the sample companies the an-
nouncement day average abnormal return is -0,58% and it’s statistically significant at 
five percent level. The most negative event day abnormal returns occur for fami-
ly/person ownership subsample (-1,13%) and the most positive or least negative reac-
tion (-0,19%) is detected for state ownership firms. The event day abnormal returns are 
negative for all of the different ownership subsamples. Thus, the first hypothesis is ac-
cepted based on the event study results.  
 
The sample is also divided into different subsamples based on the layoff reason and 
recession. The layoff reasons are reactive such as declined demand and proactive e.g. 
restructuring. The results show that reactive layoff announcements seem to cause more 
negative stock market reaction than proactive announcements. The announcement day 
average abnormal return for reactive layoff announcements is -1,05%. The abnormal 
returns for proactive layoff announcements are also negative but not significant. Thus, 
investors might see the reactive layoff announcements as a sign of worsened financial 
condition of the firms. Proactive layoff announcements, in turn, are not seen as signifi-
cant value affecting thing.   
 
According to the results, the layoff announcements that are made during recession cause 
abnormal return of -0,67% at the event day but none of the cumulative abnormal returns 
are statistically significant. For the upturn period layoff announcements in turn, the cu-
mulative abnormal returns are more negative and significant than for recession period. 
Thus, there is no clear difference in the reactions between the recession and non-
recession periods. The economic situation in Finland has not been very good after the 
financial crisis and the economic growth has been low. This might explain why the re-
sults are not in line with previous findings which have stated that layoff announcements 
during recession cause more negative stock market reaction.   
 
The cumulative abnormal returns are tested then with OLS regression which includes 
dummy variables for ownership structures, layoff reason and recession and a variable 
for layoff size. The results show that the state ownership dummy is positive and statisti-
cally significant. Thus, the state ownership affects positively to the stock market reac-
tion. Perhaps the market sees that state owned companies are inefficient and layoffs are 
therefore a good way to improve the efficiency. The state might have different objec-
tives such as preserving the jobs. Therefore, when state owned companies reduce their 
workforce other investors might see it as a positive thing because then return maximiz-
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ing strategy is implemented. This finding is indicating that there are some significant 
differences in the stock market reactions based on the ownership structure of the firms. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis can be accepted based on the regression OLS regres-
sion results.  
 
The layoff reason (reactive) and recession dummies are not statistically significant. 
Even though the average abnormal returns for the different days in the event window 
show that reactive layoff announcements cause more negative stock market reaction 
than proactive ones, according to the regression results for cumulative abnormal returns 
reactive layoff announcements’ reactions do not differ statistically significantly from the 
proactive ones. As a result, the fifth hypothesis can’t be accepted. In addition, the layoff 
size variable is negative but insignificant. Consequently, also the third and fourth hy-
potheses are rejected.  
 
Furthermore, an additional regression model is constructed to study the joint impact of 
the reactive layoff reason and different ownership groups and recession. Therefore, an 
interaction term is added to the regression. The results show that concentrated owner-
ship and reactive layoff reason together have statistically significant negative impact on 
the stock market reaction. Also the recession dummy is positive indicating that layoff 
announcements made during recession have positive impact on the reaction. Therefore, 
the hypothesis three cannot be accepted.   
 
All in all, the layoff announcements cause overall negative and significant stock market 
reaction in Finland. The market might view the layoffs as a negative sign of the future 
growth expectations of the downsizing firms. There are differences in the abnormal re-
turns between the different ownership structure firms. The state ownership affects posi-
tively to the stock market reaction to layoff announcements. In addition, if the downsiz-
ing firm has concentrated ownership structure and the layoff reason is reactive the im-
pact is significantly negative. 
 
The use of Finnish data can be considered as a limitation in this study. There are only 
few observations especially in institutional and foreign ownership groups. The stock 
market reactions to layoff announcements for different ownership structure firms could 
be examined with a larger sample and in different countries. For example, the U.S. mar-
kets would be large enough to get a good sized sample. In addition, it would be interest-
ing to study further the different ownership structure firms’ stock market performance in 
a longer time period after the layoffs especially the state ownership companies’. 
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